The Yet-to-Be Effective But Effective Tax: Hong Kong's Buyer's Stamp Duty as a Critical Case Study of Legislation by Press Release by Chen, J
Title
The Yet-to-Be Effective But Effective Tax: Hong Kong's Buyer's
Stamp Duty as a Critical Case Study of Legislation by Press
Release
Author(s) Chen, J
Citation University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review, 2015, v. 10 n.1, p. 1-64
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/209723
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2592671 
1 
 
THE YET-TO-BE EFFECTIVE BUT EFFECTIVE TAX: HONG 
KONG’S BUYER’S STAMP DUTY AS A CRITICAL CASE STUDY 
OF LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE  
 
10 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW __ (2015) 
 
Jianlin Chen* 
Abstract 
When a government announces that an existing law will be 
amended and that the amendment, when finally enacted by the legislature, 
will be made effective from the announcement date, it is natural and 
inevitable that private entities will conduct their activities on the basis of 
the amended law immediately upon the announcement date, 
notwithstanding the announcement’s lack of any formal legal effect. This 
practice of effecting immediate de facto legal changes is known 
derisively, but perhaps aptly, as “legislation by press release.” This 
Article utilizes the recent use of legislation by press release to implement 
the Buyer’s Stamp Duty in Hong Kong as a case study to critically 
examine the legality and normative considerations of this increasingly 
common but under-theorized practice. Legally, this Article argues that 
the prospective notice provided by the initial announcement ensures the 
practice’s legality in all but an explicit prohibition of retrospective civil 
legislation. Normatively, this Article highlights the various criteria of 
clarity, consistency, necessity and political dynamic that affect the 
desirability of the practice. On a broader note, the formal retrospectivity 
inherent in the practice - but which does not disrupt the reliance interests 
of private entities - provides a useful reexamination of the conventional 
aversion towards retrospective laws.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Retrospective laws1 have never failed to capture the attention of legal scholars. From the 
early writings of eminent jurists such as Blackstone and Hobbes2 to modern journals and books 
devoted to the subject,3 the notion of laws that catch individuals off-guard by subsequently 
changing the legal consequences of past actions has always had the capacity to excite discussions 
thereof. This copious literature has delved into the various aspects of the concept, such as the 
tension between the hostility towards statutory retrospectivity versus the more tacit acquiescence 
of adjudicative retrospectivity,4 the relationship between retrospectivity and the rule of law,5 the 
distinction between the common law presumption against retrospectivity and the presumption 
against interference with vested rights,6 and the compatibility of retrospective laws with general 
constitutional and/or human rights requirements of “in accordance with law” or similarly worded 
provisions.7  
                                                 
1 For a discussion about the various – and at times confusing – definitions of retrospective laws and the related 
concept of retroactive laws, see infra II.A. 
2 For a concise discussion about the historical origin on retrospectivity, including the early scholarly works, see BEN 
JURATOWITCH, RETROACTIVITY AND THE COMMON LAW 27-35 (Hart Publishing 2008); CHARLES SAMPFORD, 
RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 9-17 (Oxford University Press 2006). For examples of early treatise 
devoted to retrospective law, see WILLIAM G. MYER, VESTED RIGHTS: SELECTED CASES AND NOTES ON 
RETROSPECTIVE AND ARBITRARY LEGISLATION AFFECTING VESTED RIGHTS OF PROPERTY (Gilbert Book Company 
1891); WILLIAM PRATT WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RETROACTIVE LAWS: AS 
AFFECTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS (F. H. Thomas & Company 1880). 
3 E.g., JURATOWITCH, supra note 2; John Prebble, Rebecca Prebble & Catherine Vidler Smith, Legislation with 
Retrospective Effect, with Particular Reference to Tax Loopholes and Avoidance, 22 NEW ZEALAND UNIVERSITIES 
LAW REVIEW 17 (2006); CHARLES SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at (Oxford University Press 2006); J. Paul Salembier, 
Understanding Retroactivity: When the Past Just Ain’t What it Used to be, 33 HONG KONG L. J. 99 (2003); Ulf 
Bernitz, Retroactive Legislation in a European Perspective – On the Importance of General Principles of Law, 2000 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 43 (2000); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997); Andrew Palmer & Charles Sampford, Retrospective Legislation in Australia: Looking 
Back at the 1980s, 22 FED. L. REV. 217 (1993). 
4 E.g., JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-109 & 220-222 (detailed analysis of court’s divergence approach towards 
the two types of retrospectivity, and argued that a more uniform and principled approach is desirable); Fisch, supra 
note 3 (arguing against the disparate treatment towards the two types of retrospectivity and for a uniformed approach 
where retrospective laws is permissible if the regulatory context is in flux). 
5 E.g., MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND RIGHTS 239-262 (Ashgate 2007) (examining 
the implication on rule of law arising from the retrospective criminal sanctioning of individuals who committed 
morally reprehensible acts that are formally legal in a prior totalitarian regime); SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 257-288 
(contextual discussion of the various types of retrospective laws and argues that there will be circumstances where 
retrospective laws are both normative desirable and consistent with the rule of law properly understood). 
6 E.g., Salembier, supra note 3, at 116-118 & 137-138 (arguing for a clear conceptual distinction between the two 
presumptions since, notwithstanding the close relationship between the two, each deals with specific and distinct 
harm). 
7 E.g., Melvin R.T. Pauwels, Retroactive Tax Legislation in View of Article 1 First Protocol ECHR, 2013/6 EC TAX 
REVIEW 268 (2013) (discussing how European Court of Human Rights assess the permissibility of retroactive taxes 
in light of Article 1 of the First Protocol that provides “No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law.” 
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There is a particular type of retrospective law that has received relatively scant attention. 
Known derisively as “legislation by press release,” this practice involves the government 
announcing that an existing law will be amended and that the amendment, when finally enacted 
by the legislature, will be made effective from the announcement date. 8  The coining of 
“legislation” is rather apt because, notwithstanding the announcement’s lack of any formal legal 
effect, it is natural and inevitable that private entities will conduct their activities on the basis of 
the amended law immediately upon the announcement date. Yet, despite the increasing usage in 
various jurisdictions9 of this potent tool of the executive branch to exercise immediate de facto 
legal influence on the behavior of private entities without any legislative authorization, the 
considerations that are applicable in assessing the normative desirability of legislation by press 
release has remained largely unexamined.10 In what circumstances, if any at all, can the use of 
legislation by press release be desirable?  
Legislation by press release also poses interesting conceptual challenges to the 
conventional understanding of retrospective laws. The retrospectivity of the new law is 
unquestioned given the explicit backdating of legal effect, yet the typical objections to 
retrospective laws that are based on the protection of reliance interests of individuals11 are not 
applicable if the government announcement is accompanied by a sufficiently clear and detailed 
description of the new law. In this regard, does “retrospectivity” still warrant a categorical 
“heightened scrutiny” in legal doctrines such as the presumption against retrospectivity12 and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(emphasis added)). See also Daniel Deák, Pioneering Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary to Invoke the 
Protection of Human Dignity in Tax Matters, 39 INTERTAX 534 (2011) (discussing the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court use of the “protection of human dignity” to invalidate the retrospectivity of certain confiscatory tax); Bernitz, 
supra note 3, at 51-55 (the requirement of “legal certainty” and retrospective law). See infra IV.B.2. 
8 Joseph Jaconelli, Tax Legislation, Forestalling, and Economic Information, 2013 PUBLIC LAW 737, 745 (2013); 
Terry Hayes & Kirk Wilson, Proposed Amendments to Australia’s Anti-Avoidance Laws Cause Business 
Uncertainty, 23 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 52, 52 (2012); Robert Påhlsson, Retroactivity: Swedish 
Practice on Legislation by Governmental Communication, 39 INTERTAX 271, 271-272 (2011); Miranda Stewart & 
Kristen Walker, Australia: National Report, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 193, 239 (2007); SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 
156-157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 235. 
9 In Australia, the use become prevalent since the late 1970s: Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 239; SAMPFORD, 
supra note 2, at 156. In Canada, see Salembier, supra note 3, at 107. In the U.K., see Infobank, Taxation: 
Legislation by Press Release, 1992(7) BUS. L. R. (U.K.) 176, 176-177 (1992). In Sweden, see Påhlsson, supra note 8, 
at 274. 
10 The most detailed treatment of legislation by press release is by Charles Sampford, see SAMPFORD, supra note 2, 
at 156-162; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 262-270. For other mentions/discussions, see II.C. 
11 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 77; Prebble, Prebble & Smith, supra note 3, at 
19; Salembier, supra note 3, at 106-107; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1084-1085. See infra II.B. 
12 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 67-118; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-116. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & 
EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 188-192 (LexisNexis 5th ed. 2010) (discussing U.S. courts’ approach 
in the specific context of statutory retroactivity in comparative negligence rules). 
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outright ban of retrospective laws,13 or should the inquiry be reoriented towards the underlying 
harms that are commonly associated with but not inevitable or exclusive to retrospective laws?  
The recent implementation of the Buyer’s Stamp Duty [“BSD”] in Hong Kong provides 
an illustrative case study to examine these pertinent issues. On October 27, 2012, the Financial 
Secretary (akin to the Finance Minister) made a sudden announcement that a new transaction tax 
of 15% of a property’s value would be imposed on all residential property purchasers who are 
not permanent residents of Hong Kong.14 This new tax is a property-cooling measure intended to 
curb the rapid rise in property prices that has occurred over the past couple of years.15 The BSD 
would be applicable to all property transactions taking place on or after October 28, 2012, one 
day subsequent to the announcement. Notwithstanding the fact that the draft bill giving effect to 
this new tax would only be ready a few months after the announcement16 and that the draft bill 
would continue to languish in the legislature for sixteen months before its eventual enactment,17 
the effects of this yet-to-be-enacted law have been keenly felt by all relevant parties since the 
purported effective date of October 28, 2012. Demand from foreigners—the target of the new 
tax—dropped precipitously.18 Land developers made more conservative bids for new land.19 
Lawyers handling property transactions collected several billion Hong Kong dollars (HKD) in 
pending BSDs.20 Most significantly, the purported legislative objective of cooling the property 
                                                 
13 E.g., Hungary: Deák, supra note 7, at 540-541; Sweden: Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 
43-47 (the constitutional prohibition of retroactive tax and fee was added in 1979 to complement the existing 
prohibition on retroactive criminal law); Oman: Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 744. 
14 Tom Holland, Excluding Mainlanders Won’t Allay Main Property Grievance, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), 
Oct. 29, 2012, at 8. There is no “Hong Kong citizen” in Hong Kong – “Permanent Resident” is the highest level of 
immigration/residency status that can be obtained and which enjoyed the most rights and privileges in Hong Kong. 
For a concise exposition on the various aspects of “citizenship” in Hong Kong, including historical evolution, 
manners of acquisition and legal implications, see  Johannes Chan, Nationality and Permanent Residence, in LAW 
OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 143 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., Sweet & Maxwell 2011). 
15 Joyce Ng, Amy Nip & Joshua But, Buyers Rush to Beat Surprise Homes Tax, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), 
Oct. 27, 2012, at 1. For a discussion of the property market in Hong Kong, see infra III.A. 
16 Joyce Ng & Sandy Li, C.Y. Snubs City Companies’ Pleas for Tax Exemption, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), 
Dec. 19, 2012, at 1; Joyce Ng, Stamp Duty’s Loophole will not be Closed by Bill, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(HK), Nov. 3, 2012, at 3. 
17 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, 18(9) GAZETTE (H.K.), Feb. 28, 2014; Liang Yongsi, “Shuangla” 
shihu le! [“Double Cooling Measures” Finally Passed], SINGTAO DAILY (HK), Feb. 23, 2014, at A1. 
18 Sandy Li, SHKP Trims Luxuries at Top End of Town, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Dec. 28, 2012, at 3 
(Business); Paggie Leung, Home Tax Puts Chill in Mainland Buyers, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Nov. 2, 
2012, at 1 (Business); Peggy Sito, New Buyer’s Hopes Rise with Tax, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Oct. 31, 
2012, at 1 (Property). 
19 Yvonne Liu, Big Two Developers Cool Their Heels, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), July 10, 2013, at 1 
(Property); Sandy Li, Developer Caution Hangs Over Land Sale Prospects, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), 
Jan. 2, 2013, at 4 (Business). 
20 Caiye gaoji: foujue lazhao lougu zheng [Financial Secretary Warning: Vetoing Cooling Measures Would Result 
in Tumor in Property and Stock Market], SINGTAO DAILY (HK), Feb. 22, 2014, at A4; Lazhao zaoan zhao labu shuyi 
suikuan jiya [Filibuster of Property Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of Tax], 
ORIENTAL DAILY NEWS (HK), Nov. 27, 2013. The exchange rate of HKD pegged to the USD at a rate of about 7.8:1: 
6 
 
market was at least partially achieved, with secondary home prices witnessing a modest fall, a 
reversal of the substantial increase over the previous two years.21 
 This Article critically examines this episode of legislation by press release to make three 
main arguments. The first is a relatively narrow but previously unexplored legal issue—namely, 
that regardless of the normative desirability of legislation by press release, the practice is legal in 
Hong Kong. The constitutional prohibition of retrospective laws22 is limited to criminal sanctions 
and is not applicable to a property-transaction tax that is not punitive in nature. More 
significantly, although the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights have indicated 
that retrospective non-criminal laws may be potentially at risk of violating the expanded notion 
of “law” in the “prescribed by law” requirement typically stipulated in human rights documents 
for imposition of legal burdens,23 the detailed specifics of the proposed law set out in the initial 
announcement under a typical legislation by press release would have effectively shielded it 
from this legal challenge.      
 The second argument draws on the insight arising from this first-ever detailed contextual 
examination of actual legislation by press release to articulate the considerations that affect the 
normative desirability of the practice. Beyond the relatively obvious requirement that the initial 
announcement must be sufficiently clear and consistent with respect to the new legal rules, there 
must also be sufficient justifications for what is essentially a short-circuiting of the legislative 
process. Reflecting the mixed assessment of whether the use of legislation by press release to 
implement the BSD is actually necessary to achieve the policy goal of property cooling,24 the 
necessary inquiry would first entail identifying the purported legislative objectives, before being 
followed up by an examination of the incentives created for private entities by the policy 
announcement to predict and assess whether a forward shift of the activities targeted by the legal 
change would derail the legislative objectives.  
In addition, given that the main critique of legislation by press release is the violation of 
separation of powers, with the executive essentially engaging in a de facto form of law-making,25 
the desirability of legislation by press release is intrinsically linked to the underlying political 
dynamic. The political dynamic of a jurisdiction is the product of the interplay between the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Y. Y. Kueh & Raymond C. W. Ng, The Interplay of the “China Factor” and US Dollar Peg in the Hong Kong 
Economy, 170 CHINA QUARTERLY 387 (2002). 
21 Sandy Li, Curbs Likely to Stay Until Prices Fall, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Aug. 21, 2013, at 1 
(Property); Peggy Sito & Joyce Ng, Secondary Home Prices Continues Fall on Duties, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (HK), Dec. 8, 2012, at 2 (Business). 
22 §12, Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, c. 383 (1997) (HK). See infra IV.B. 
23 For a discussion of the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on this issue, see Pauwels, supra note 7, at 
272; Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 273. For the argument in the context of Hong Kong, see Sir Anthony Mason, The 
Place of Comparative Law in Developing the Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 
37 HONG KONG L. J. 299, 314-315 (2007). See infra IV.B.2. 
24 Infra IV.B.2. 
25 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-161; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264-265. 
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formal constitutional structure and political competition on the ground.26 Legislation by press 
release is most undesirable where a formal separation of powers between the executive and 
legislature is combined with an agnostic and divided political landscape. Conversely, the various 
criticisms against legislation by press release27 are largely moot under a Westminster system that 
envisages a close relationship between the executive and the legislature, when both are 
dominated by a single political party.  
 The final argument challenges the conventional aversion towards formally retrospective 
laws and highlights the irrelevancy of a law’s formal retrospectivity to the disruption caused to 
the reliance interests of private individuals. This argument echoes the insight provided by the 
well-established U.S. legal literature on “legal transition,”28 but with an additional contribution 
observing how the assumption of stable legal regime that underpins the general objections 
toward retrospective laws is particularly ill-suited for jurisdictions undergoing major political 
and democratic transitions. In these jurisdictions—which are more the norm than the exception 
around the globe today—stability in the maintenance of the prior regime is neither expected nor 
desired.  
 This Article is organized into seven Parts. Part II explores the existing literature to 
present the theoretical framework governing retrospective laws and legislation by press release. 
Part III examines the implementation of the BSD in Hong Kong—in particular, the twists and 
turns in the protracted legislative process and the real effect of the announcement in shaping the 
behaviors of the relevant parties. Part IV addresses the legality of legislation by press release 
with respect to the legal doctrines of retrospectivity, “in accordance with law” and taxing powers. 
Part V analyzes the factors relevant to assessing whether the employment of legislation by press 
release is normatively justified. Part VI discusses the broader implications on the understanding 
of retrospective laws. Part VII concludes.   
 
                                                 
26 Infra V.C.1. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2311 (2006) (critically discussing how competition between political parties can vary and even at times 
overshadow the institutional competition between the different branches of government); Anthony Kammer, 
Privatizing the Safeguards of Federalism, 29 J.L. & POL. 69 (2013) (examining how political coordination between 
influential private entities can transcend the formal jurisdictional boundaries of federalism). C.f. Tara Leigh Grove, 
The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 312-314 (2012) (arguing that for the 
judicial branch at least, formal inter-branch separation of power remains salient even in the context where the 
executive and legislature are of the same political affiliation).      
27 These primarily include uncertainty, especially from the delay in legislative ratification, and violation to the 
separation of powers, see infra II.C. 
28 Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Michael J. Graetz, 
Legal Transitions: the Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PENN. L. REV. 47 (1977). See infra VI. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: RETROSPECTIVE LAWS AND 
LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE 
This Part initiates the discussion by first addressing definitional issues surrounding 
retrospective laws before reviewing the existing literature on the normative considerations 
surrounding retrospective laws in general and legislation by press release in particular.  
A. Retrospectivity and Retroactivity  
A discussion of retrospective laws naturally should begin with the definition of 
“retrospective,” especially in comparison with the similar and related concept of “retroactivity.” 
Despite numerous attempts to provide a conclusive working definition, both terms have been 
used to denote different meanings by different scholars. 29  The fact that the two terms are 
commonly cross-referenced in the dictionary30 only serves to aggravate the confusion, especially 
in non-legal discourse (i.e., political and public debate). The general consensus reflected in 
modern literature is that “retroactive law” is a narrower—and, often, normatively more 
problematic—conceptual subset of “retrospective law,”31 although some scholars have begun to 
advocate abolishing the formal distinction between the two.32  
Beyond this broad consensus, the precise content of the definition remains unsettled. For 
example, Ben Juratwoitch’s 2008 book on “retroactivity” and English common law proposed 
restricting “retroactive” laws to mean only laws that “apply to a past event as though it was 
applicable at the time of the event”,33 such as “[a] law entering into force on Wednesday making 
it an offence to have parked on High Street from the preceding Monday onwards.”34 This usage 
is to be contrasted with the broader concept of “retrospective” laws, which include not only 
“retroactive” laws but also laws that have inter-temporal effects, such as how a law prospectively 
banning parking might affect a long-term parking permit.35 By contrast, Charles Sampford, in his 
book on the broader concept of “retrospectivity,” defined “retrospective” laws “as laws which 
alter the future legal consequences of past actions and events because the legal texts that will be 
                                                 
29 For a general discussion about the confusing and conflicting use of the term, see JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 6-
17; Salembier, supra note 3, at 104-107. See also SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 9-17 (providing a historical 
perspective on the development of the concept of retrospectivity). 
30 Salembier, supra note 3, at 105. 
31 E.g., Pauwels, supra note 7, at 270-272; Hans Gribnau, Equality, Legal Certainty and Tax Legislation in the 
Netherlands, 9(2) UTRECHT L. REV. 52, 71 (2013); Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 9-
12 & 17; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17; Salembier, supra note 3, at 102-106. 
32 E.g., Prebble, Prebble & Smith, supra note 3, at 24-29; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17-23. The tendency to 
dispense the distinction most pronounce in the predominantly U.S. legal  literature on “legal transition”: see infra VI. 
33 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 17. 
34 id, at 5. 
35 id, at 9-12. 
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applied to determine the legal consequences of an action at a hearing in the future are not same 
as the texts that were discoverable at the time the action commenced.”36 This definition appears 
similar to Juratwotich’s definition of “retroactivity,”37 even if Sampford appeared to agree that 
“retroactive” should “refer to retrospective laws whose retrospective effect is formally and 
explicitly stated by indicating that an enactment is to take effect before its promulgation.”38 The 
journal article by John Prebble, Rebecca Prebble and Catherine Vidler Smith similarly presented 
an illustrative example of the difficulty in defining the concept of “retrospectivity.” In their 
article, they began by explicitly adopting the definition that “[r]etropsective legislation can be 
seen as altering the direct legal consequences of past events or statuses,”39 then distinguished this 
definition by also stating that “[r]etrospective legislation can be seen as altering the future legal 
consequences of past events” (i.e., the difference between “direct” and “future”),40 and finally 
emphasized that the definition used in their article “addresses both legislation that is clearly 
retrospective in that in applies to dates before its commencement and legislation that is not 
explicitly retrospective but that affects pre-existing rights and expectations.”41 
Part of the reason for the confusion is due to the different context in which the definition 
and/or distinction is formulated. In jurisdictions where “retroactive” laws—but not “retrospective” 
laws—are constitutionally prohibited, the definition of “retroactive” must be given a clearly 
defined and narrow meaning to mitigate the dire legal significance that flows from it. 42 
Unsurprisingly, the distinction is less material in jurisdictions where there is no outright 
prohibition against “retroactive” laws, such as under EU law, for which the European Court of 
Human Rights has employed both terms interchangeably.43 In English common law jurisdictions, 
where the issue of the “presumption against retrospectivity” in statutory interpretation is at stake, 
the inquiry inevitably focuses on “retrospectivity” to the neglect of “retroactivity.” 44 
Alternatively, in the U.S., where the rule is known as the presumption against statutory 
                                                 
36 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 37.  
37 Ben Juratowitch considered, and disagreed with, Sampford’s position in the debate as simply that distinction 
between retrospective and retroactive is immaterial since the effect of both is the same: JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, 
at 11-12.  
38 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 17. 
39 Prebble, Prebble & Smith, supra note 3, at 20. 
40 Id., at 24. 
41 Id., at 25. 
42 See Deák, supra note 7, at 540-541 (discussing how the Hungarian Constitutional Court found that “[a] tax law 
that provides during the tax year subsequently for the taxation of the income derived during the year cannot be 
considered as retroactive [and is instead permissible retrospective legislation] … because the process of earning 
income under taxation has not yet been closed by a tax return to be filed following the year in which the taxable 
income is derived.”). See also Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272 (discussing Swedish constitutional prohibition on 
retroactive tax legislation). 
43 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 270. 
44 Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-116. For a detailed discussion on the presumption, see JURATOWITCH, supra note 
2, at 67-118. 
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“retroactivity,” the conceptual distinction of “primary retroactivity” and “secondary retroactivity” 
enjoyed considerable—if ultimately temporary—usage in the literature.45    
In Hong Kong, an English common law jurisdiction, 46 the salience of the common law 
doctrine of the “presumption against retrospectivity” most likely explains why “retrospective” is 
commonly employed to describe laws that are otherwise clearly “retroactive.” For example, in 
the context of drafting a law that was going to be expressly backdated, questions were raised in 
the legislative process about existing laws that have “retrospective effects.” 47  This concern 
prompted the administration to produce a list of legislation where the stipulated effective dates 
preceded the date of enactment/amendment.48 This usage of “retrospective” is perpetuated by 
legal professionals, with the Law Society of Hong Kong raising, in the same context, the 
“question of the constitutionality of making the [law] retrospective.”49 
For the purpose of this Article, the precise nuances of the definitional distinction between 
“retrospective” and “retroactive” are immaterial because legislation by press releases would 
clearly satisfy even the narrower category of “retroactive” laws, given the explicit backdating of 
the effective statutory date. This Article utilizes the term “retrospective” partly to synchronize 
with the usage in Hong Kong and partly to reflect this Article’s inclination that addressing the 
broader concept of “retrospectivity” is normatively more meaningful than trying to carve out a 
separate conceptual category of “retroactivity.”50  
B. General Concerns about Retrospective Laws 
Regardless of the precise definition and understanding of “retrospective”/“retroactive” 
laws, it is indisputable that such laws are generally viewed with great hostility. Charles Sampford 
                                                 
45 See Fisch, supra note 3, at 1067-1069 (discussing and rejecting the conceptual dichotomy). In Germany, the 
distinction is between “real” retroactivity and “apparent” retroactivity: Georg Nolte & Peter Radler, German Public 
Law Cases in 1996/97, 3(4) EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 489, 495 (1997) 
46 Johannes Chan, The Judiciary, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 289, 289 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim 
eds., Sweet & Maxwell 2011). 
47 E.g., Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Responses to Follow-up Actions Arising from 
Discussion at the Meeting on 9 February 2011, Feb., 2011, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 1371/10-11(02). See also 
Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), June 14, 2010, 7550-7553 (on the 
retrospective effect of the Family Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill in 2000). 
48 The Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 47; Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 
2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Responses to Follow-up Actions Arising from Discussion at the Meetings on 17 and 
21 December 2010 (Part II), Jan., 2011, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 1125/10-11(01), at 2. 
49  Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, Summary of Views Submitted by 
Organizations/Individuals on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 1689/10-
11(04), at 18. 
50  Infra VI. C.f., while Juratowitch argues the opposite (that “intertemporal effects of “retrospectivity” are 
meaningfully different to retroactivity – so different as to demand separate categorization”), his discussions about 
the various rationales for the presumption against “retroactivity” (such as certainty, negative liberty, fair warning 
and defeasiblity) is equally applicable to “retrospectivity”: see JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 12 & 43-65.  
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candidly observed that “[n]othing is more certain to cause apoplectic explosions of fear and 
loathing among some lawyers than the mere mention of the dreaded word ‘retrospectivity.’”51 
This homage to the negative image of retrospective laws is typically the starting point, especially 
common in academic literature that has sought—perhaps somewhat ironically—to present a 
more nuanced approach towards retrospectivity. 52  Even in the absence of explicit legal 
prohibition of retrospective laws, retrospectivity is often a cause for concern, especially in 
statutory law. The common law doctrine of the presumption against retrospectivity in statutory 
interpretation is precisely intended to compel the legislature to directly confront the issue of 
retrospectivity. 53  In Australia, retrospectivity in the legislation bill is routinely grounds for 
objection by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, the committee in the upper 
house of the bicameral parliamentary system that is responsible for vetting legislation.54 In the 
Netherlands, a memorandum setting out guidelines limiting the use of retrospective statues was 
issued by the government in response to “serious concerns” by Parliament.55 Similarly, in Hong 
Kong, retrospectivity—especially for explicit legislative backdating—invites scrutiny 
occasionally.56 
The central theme of the various objections to retrospective laws is people’s reliance on 
the law as a guide for their conduct.57 Closely connected to the notion of the rule of law,58 the 
normative principle is that private individuals should be able determine the legal consequences 
of their intended activities and arrange their affairs accordingly. Given their nature of being 
subsequently created legal rules that seek to alter the legal consequences of past actions, 
retrospective laws run afoul of this normative principle because private individuals cannot 
                                                 
51 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 1. 
52 The central thesis of Charles Sampford’s book is that while the importance of the reliance interest weighs 
generally against retrospective laws, this factor is neither overwhelming nor unequivocal and the same reliance 
interest may be used to justify retrospective law: SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 7. For other examples, see Pauwels, 
supra note 7 (discussing without strong criticism the European Court of Human Rights ambivalent and context 
sensitive treatment of retrospective laws); JURATOWITCH, supra note 2 (examining the circumstances in which the 
presumption against retrospectivity may be justifiably rebutted); Prebble, Prebble & Smith, supra note 3 (arguing 
that retrospective laws are neither illegal or unconstitutional under New Zealand law, and are at times justified). C.f. 
PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 67-68 (Forum 2000) 
(retrospective laws, including those imposing monetary losses from civil liability, are plainly undesirable). 
53 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 68-71; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-118. 
54 Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 239-240; CHARLES SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-162; Palmer & Sampford, 
supra note 3, at 268. For a discussion of the Senate role and power in Australian legislative process, see PATRICK 
KEYZER, PRINCIPLES OF AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52-53 (LexisNexis 3rd ed. 2010); Stewart & Walker, 
supra note 8, at 204-207. 
55 Gribnau, supra note 31, at 71-72. 
56 Infra IV.B.4. 
57 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; GOLDING, supra note 5, at 246; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 77; Prebble, 
Prebble & Smith, supra note 3, at 19; Salembier, supra note 3, at 106-107; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1084-1085. 
58 For a discussion about relationship between rule of law and retrospective law, see Gribnau, supra note 31, at 53; 
GOLDING, supra note 5, at 240-252; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 77-98. 
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possibly be “guided” by laws that do not yet exist .59 This situation also gives rise to possible 
injustice when the individuals’ expectations in relation to the legal consequences of their actions 
are disrupted.60  
Other ancillary objections to retrospective laws include arguments based on democracy 
and certainty. The democracy objection charges that a government exceeds the temporal limits 
on the government mandate when it enacts retrospective laws overriding decisions of a previous 
government.61 Nonetheless, the objection would apply neither to situations in which the prior 
government is not democratic nor to retrospective legislation whose backdating effects still fall 
within the tenure of the enacting the government62—as is typical of legislation by press release. 
The certainty objection is related both to the rule of law considerations regarding reliance on 
laws for guidance and to the economic considerations regarding the distortion of incentives to 
invest.63 Under this argument, the permissible use of retrospective laws generates uncertainty for 
individuals attempting to plan their activities, leading to the dilution of the guidance function of 
the existing laws and underinvestment on account of these uncertainties. On the economic 
considerations front, U.S. scholars employing economic analysis have argued that the uncertainty 
generated by expressly retrospective laws is no less than that of nominally prospective laws that 
affect activities of a substantial time horizon,64 whereas Louis Kaplow further argued that there 
is no real difference between uncertainties due to legal change and uncertainties due to ordinary 
market fluctuation.65 
C. Legislation by Press Release 
The BSD, notwithstanding the undeniably explicit retrospective effect, is distinct from 
conventional retrospective laws. The effective date of the implementation, while being set at a 
date prior to the enactment, is only backdated to the date in which there was an express public 
announcement by the government declaring its implementation. This practice of “legislation by 
press release” mitigates the reservations of retrospective laws while introducing new concerns. 
                                                 
59 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 268; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 44-64; GOLDING, supra note 5, at 250; SAMPFORD, 
supra note 2, at 77; Prebble, Prebble & Smith, supra note 3, at 19; Salembier, supra note 3, at 106-107; Bernitz, 
supra note 3, at 43. 
60 Gribnau, supra note 31, at 70-71; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 45; GOLDING, supra note 5, at 251; SAMPFORD, 
supra note 2, at 87-95; ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 52, at 67-68. 
61 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 68-70; Prebble, Prebble & Smith, supra note 3, at 46-47; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1121; 
Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 225-226. 
62 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 71-72; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 225-226. 
63 Gribnau, supra note 31, at 70-71; JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 48-49; ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 52, at 
75-76; Kaplow, supra note 28, at 522-532. 
64 Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L. J. 1015, 1016 & 1022-
1023 (2006); DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULE CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION 
RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 16-32 (University of Chicago Press 2000); Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089-1091. 
65 Kaplow, supra note 28, at 533-536. For critical analysis of this view, see SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 238-240. 
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Given the central theme of protecting the rational and legitimate expectations underpinning the 
objections to retrospective laws, the public statement by the government announcing—
prospectively, no less—changes to the law ensures that private individuals will not be caught off 
guard by the subsequent legal changes that will be retrospectively applied to the date of the 
announcement. 66  As Charles Sampford stated, “no reasonable person would rely on a law 
remaining the same when the Minister has specifically said that it will be changed.”67   
However, this advance notice comes at a price. There are two new objections that apply 
specifically to legislation by press release that are not applicable to other retrospective laws. The 
first is uncertainty in relation to the government announcement.68 Given the typical scenario in 
which the draft bill will not be ready for presentation at the time of announcement, there is likely 
going to be uncertainty as to the precise details of the final legislation.69 Moreover, excessive 
delay70 and the possibility of subsequent amendments to the draft bill will further complicate any 
attempted prediction. This situation may not always be undesirable, especially in the context of 
tax legislation for which legislation by press release is most commonly used. Seeking out 
loopholes through a literalist interpretation of the tax law is neither a legitimate expectation to be 
protected nor a desirable behavior to be encouraged.71 This objection is also resolved if the 
announcement is made sufficiently clear.72 
The other concern with legislation by press release is the de facto exercise of legislative 
power by the executive branch in light of how the announcement substantially shapes the 
behaviors of private individuals as if it were a duly enacted law.73 Although the legislature still 
technically has the final say as to whether the law should be enacted, such practice “places the 
Parliament in the invidious position of either agreeing to the legislation without significant 
amendment or bearing the odium of overturning arrangements which many people may have 
made in reliance on the Ministerial announcement.”74  
                                                 
66 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 278; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263. 
67 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157. 
68 Hayes & Wilson, supra note 8, at 52; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 158-159. 
69 Hayes & Wilson, supra note 8, at 53; SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 158. 
70 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 161-162; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 268. 
71 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 159; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 267-268. See also Ji Lian Yap, De Facto 
Directors and Corporate Directorships, 2012 J. BUSINESS L. 579, 586-587 (2012) (observing how the ambiguity in 
the current legal definition of de facto director under U.K. company law is arguably necessary and inevitable to 
preserve the doctrine usefulness in imposing the liability of director on those who acted as such while avoiding 
formal title). C.f., Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 489 (2011) 
(discussing the perverse incentive under strategic tax law uncertainty that can thwart the objective of reducing tax 
evasion). 
72 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 278. 
73 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160-161; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264-265. 
74 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 160 (quoting the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills). 
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 Commentators in various jurisdictions have observed the increasingly prevalent use of 
such a legislative “mechanism.”75 One key reason is the ability of legislation by press release to 
effect de facto legal changes immediately, which is especially necessary in situations In which 
private entities can circumvent the policy objective by shifting forward activities that would 
otherwise be affected by the announced change in law.76 Another likely reason is that, when 
retrospective legislation is expedient or necessary,77 the provision of an announcement helps 
mitigate the political pressure and/or public backlash that might otherwise be generated by the 
use of retrospective laws. Indeed, in Hong Kong, the government has expressly relied on public 
notification through policy announcement when defending legislative amendments that are to be 
backdated.78 Likewise, in Sweden, an exception to the general prohibition of retroactive tax 
legislation is carved out for what is essentially legislation by press release.79  
 
III. THE CASE STUDY OF HONG KONG’S BSD 
Having examined the relevant theoretical framework, this Part turns to the recent 
implementation of the BSD in Hong Kong as a case study for examining in detail the legal and 
normative considerations of legislation by press release.    
A. Regulating the Vibrant Property Market 
Property is a source of wealth in Hong Kong, an autonomous jurisdiction under the 
sovereignty of China since its handover from British colonial rule in 1997.80 With over seven 
million people packed into an economically vibrant jurisdiction of a mere 1104 square 
kilometers,81 real estate is not regarded merely as places for residential or commercial purposes 
but as a vehicle for investment and speculation.82 Property booms and busts have dotted the 
                                                 
75 In Australia, the use become prevalent since the late 1970s: Stewart & Walker, supra note 8, at 239; SAMPFORD, 
supra note 2, at 156. In Canada, see Salembier, supra note 3, at 107. In the U.K., see Infobank, supra note 9, at 176-
177. In Sweden, see Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 274. 
76 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264. See also 
Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738-740 (discussing the problem of “forestalling” by private entities in response to 
knowledge of pending tax). See infra V.B.2. 
77 C.f. infra V.B.1. 
78 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 49, at 18. 
79 Tax legislation can be retrospective to the date in which the “government issues a communication to Parliament 
(emphasis original)”: Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 272; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 47. 
80 Johannes Chan, From Colony to Special Administrative Region, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 3, 28-
29 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., Sweet & Maxwell 2011). 
81 Hong Kong 2012: The Facts, available at http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2012/en/pdf/Facts.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 
2014). 
82 Indeed, local academic Lawrence Law opined that rights to land is treated as mere commodity in Hong Kong, 
subjected to compensation for the sake of building of more new urban space, but without due regards to the 
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recent history of Hong Kong.83 Although the government is not oblivious to the threat posed by 
property speculation on the stability of financial institutions and the affordability of housing,84 
past measures to regulate excessive property speculation have typically focused on restrictions 
on financing 85  and the direct provision of subsidized public housing. 86  The Hong Kong 
government has previously avoided the use of direct taxation on property and property 
transactions as a regulatory tool (as opposed to revenue generation), reflecting the low-tax 
policies rooted in colonial times and later enshrined in the Basic Law87 as well as the “free 
market” ideology ostensibly advocated by the Hong Kong Government.88 The high prices and 
high transaction volume driven by speculation also arguably create a perverse incentive for the 
government to acquiesce to such a practice in the context where land sales and other land-
associated revenues are dominant sources of government revenue.89  
The first use of property tax to regulate the property market occurred in 2010. The 
property market, after a temporary setback due to the 2008 financial crisis, had begun a rapid 
ascent due to a potent mix of external factors that included the low interest rate supported by U.S. 
quantitative easing, the flood of foreign capital seeking safe haven and the involuntary 
depreciation of the HK currency, which remains pegged to the U.S. dollar.90 In November 2010, 
the government implemented the Special Stamp Duty [“SSD”], a transaction tax of up to 15% of 
the property value if a residential property is sold within a stipulated period after acquisition.91 
                                                                                                                                                             
landowner’s negative right to not use the land for profit or the aspect of land as a genuine public goods: Lawrence W. 
C. Lai, A Model of Planning by Contract: Integrating Comprehensive State Planning, Freedom of Contract, Public 
Participation and Fidelity, 81(6) THE TOWN PLANNING REVIEW 647, 667 (2010). 
83 Kueh & Ng, supra note 20, at 392. 
84 Berry F.C. Hsu, Asset Quality in HKSAR’s Real Estate Markets: A Public Policy and Legal Analysis, 19 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L.J. 263, 269-270 (2002). 
85 Kueh & Ng, supra note 20, at 392. 
86 Lai, supra note 82, at 665; Louis Augustin-Jean, Urban Planning in Hong Kong and Integration with the Pearl 
River Delta: A Historical Account of Local Development, 62 GEOJOURNAL 1, 4 (2005). 
87 Richard Cullen et al., Fiscal Policy and Financial System, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 321, 340 
(Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., Sweet & Maxwell 2011); Hsu, supra note 84, at 268. 
88  ELIZA W.Y. LEE ET AL., PUBLIC POLICYMAKING IN HONG KONG: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND STATE-SOCIETY 
RELATIONS IN A SEMI-DEMOCRACY 77-78 (Routledge 2013); Augustin-Jean, supra note 86, at 4; Hsu, supra note 84, 
at 264. 
89 Lai, supra note 82, at 665; C. Y. Jim, Planning Strategies to Overcome Constraints on Greenspace Provision in 
Urban Hong Kong, 73(2) THE TOWN PLANNING REVIEW 127, 146 (2002); Hsu, supra note 84, at 269. 
90 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Dec. 8, 2010, 3442; Official Reports of 
Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Nov. 24, 2010, 2541-2542. For a general discussion on the impact 
of the US dollar peg on the different aspects of Hong Kong economy, see generally Kueh & Ng, supra note 20.  
91 Dennis Eng, Charlotte So & Yvonne Liu, Property Speculators Slapped with up to 15pc Extra Stamp Duty, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Nov. 20, 2010, at 1; Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of 
Hong Kong), Dec. 8, 2010, 3440-3442. For final version, see §29CA Stamp Duty Ordinance, c. 117 (1997) (HK). 
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This anti-speculation tax, together with other measures targeting property financing,92 failed to 
stem the rapid rise in property prices93 or to placate the increasingly vocal public discontent over 
housing affordability.94 This situation led to the enhancement in the SSD and the imposition of 
the BSD two years later.  
B. The Buyer’s Stamp Duty 
At 6 p.m. on October 27, 2012, Financial Secretary John Tsang Chun-wah made a sudden 
and unexpected announcement regarding the introduction of two tax measures to cool the 
property market.95 First, a new BSD of 15% of the property value would be imposed on all 
residential property purchases by entities that were not Hong Kong permanent residents. Second, 
the existing SSD would be enhanced in terms of the maximum rate payable (by five percentage 
points) and the applicable duration (by one year). 96  The measures would be effective from 
midnight on the date of the announcement, leaving a mere window of six hours between the 
announcement and the measures’ implementation.97  
 The BSD is a potent form of taxation that is regarded by market watchers as tough.98 The 
Financial Secretary described the taxes as “extraordinary measures under exceptional 
circumstances”99 to “prevent even further exuberance in the housing market” and to “accord 
priority to [Hong Kong permanent resident] buyers over [non-Hong Kong permanent resident] 
buyers.”100 Indeed, property purchases by non-permanent residents had increased from 5.7% of 
                                                 
92 For example, the Monetary Authority reduced the maximum allowable loan-to-value ratio and required banks to 
conduct more stringent stress tests: Eng, So & Liu, supra note 91; Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong), Apr. 13 2011, 9157-9158. 
93 The SSD helped reduced speculative activities (measured in terms of confirmor transactions) without significantly 
reducing the property price: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Apr. 13 2011, 
9158. 
94 Thousands Join in Property Price Protest in Hong Kong, WESTERN MORNING NEWS (U.K.), July 2, 2011, at 14. 
95 Ng, Nip & But, supra note 15. 
96 Holland, supra note 14. 
97 Ng, Nip & But, supra note 15. 
98 Id. Singapore was apparently the first jurisdiction to introduce such property transactions that specifically targets 
non-residents in December 2011, with Macau following Hong Kong’s implementation just a few days thereafter: see 
Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at the Meeting of the Bills 
Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 25 January 2013, Jan., 2013, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 
511/12-13(02), Annex C (setting out the overseas experiences in relation to the purchase of residential properties by 
non-locals).    
99 Ng, Nip & But, supra note 15. 
100 Transport and Housing Bureau, Legislative Council Brief: Further Measures to Address the Overheated Property 
Market, Oct., 2012. 
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new-home purchases in 2008 to 19.5% in 2011.101 There was also arguably a political motivation 
to pander to the anti-mainland sentiment,102 with the increasing presence of mainlanders in the 
Hong Kong property market, who accounted for 42.3% of the purchases of new homes worth 
HKD12 million or more in the preceding quarter.103  
 The announcement of these tax measures sparked a frantic flurry of activity by 
developers and purchasers seeking to avoid the tax before midnight. The launch of a major 
residential project was swiftly brought forward in one day to meet the onrushing scramble of 
purchasers, with 100 flats sold by 10 p.m.—a mere four hours after the announcement.104 Similar 
moves were made by other developers as well.105 Mainland purchasers were also reportedly 
rushing from the neighboring Chinese city of Shenzhen to beat the deadline.106 This surge in last-
minute property purchases was followed by a subsequent plunge in transactions arising from the 
decrease in buyers’ interest (especially non-residents) and the withdrawal of units by sellers in 
anticipation of a fall in price.107  
C. The Protracted Legislative Process 
After the initial excitement (or agitation) subsided, the focus of the inquiry shifted to the 
details of the measures. This curious outcome was the result of not only the absence of effective 
legislation to accompany the announcement of the tax measures on October 27, 2012, but also 
the lack of a draft bill. Indeed, the preparation of the draft bill—the Stamp Duty (Amendment) 
Bill 2012 [the “Bill”]—only began after the announcement and was completed two months 
thereafter. 108  The government did upload, in conjunction with the initial announcement, an 
admirably detailed FAQ outlining the specifics and illustrative examples of the pending 
legislation on the Inland Revenue Department website.109 Nevertheless, the FAQ attracted a fair 
amount of scrutiny on the purported ambiguity of certain provisions.110  
                                                 
101 Joyce Ng, Amy Nip & Joshua But, Non-locals Hit with New Property Tax, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), 
Oct. 27, 2012, at 1. Companies accounted for 9.7% of home sales in the first three quarters of 2012: Sandy Li & 
Peggy Sito, New Levy will Reduce Sales and Prices, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Oct. 27, 2012, at 3.  
102 Johnny Tam & Tony Cheung, Levy May Hit Genuine Residents Too, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Oct. 
28, 2012, at 3 (noting the opinion of political analyst James Sung Lap-kung). 
103 Li & Sito, supra note 101. 
104 Yvonne Lou, Sandy Li & Amy Nip, Buyers in Midnight Dash for Yuen Long Flats, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (HK), Oct. 27, 2012, at 3. 
105 Id. 
106 Ng, Nip & But, supra note 15. 
107 Leung, supra note 18; Sito, supra note 18. 
108 Ng & Li, supra note 16; Ng, supra note 16. 
109 See http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
110 For example, the Hong Kong Associations Banks suggested that the FAQ provision in relation to the conveyance 
to a financial institution pursuant to a mortgage is consistent with the provision on the bill: Transport and Housing 
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In light of the ongoing legislative process, it is not surprising that interest groups and 
their corresponding legislators were actively lobbying for all sorts of variations. Many of the 
efforts were directed at diluting the effect of the BSD through the creation of additional 
exemptions. From the outset, there was a push for an exemption for companies that were owned 
by permanent residents.111 The Real Estate Developers Association, a powerful interest group 
that represents the interests of developers, sent an open letter to the government requesting an 
exemption of luxury flats of more than HKD30 million112 and later requested an exemption for 
local companies113 and then for small local companies with no more than five shareholders.114 
Abraham Razack, a functional group legislator representing the real estate and construction 
sectors,115 similarly expressed vocal opposition to the measure in its entirety116 before insisting 
on a local company exemption.117 There was also lobbying for the exemption of purchases by 
charitable organizations.118 The real-estate sector even sought support from populist legislators 
known for their anti-government rhetoric. 119  The government persistently resisted all such 
amendments on account of the potential for circumvention and exploitation of the loopholes.120 
 There was lobbying in the opposite direction as well. A lawmaker, Kenneth Leung, 
introduced proposed amendments to impose a requirement of domicile—in addition to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at the Meeting of the Bills Committee on the Stamp 
Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 18 February 2013, Apr., 2013, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 893/12-13(02). 
111 Ng & Li, supra note 16; Simpson Cheung, Developer Calls for New Look at Property Taxes, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (HK), Nov. 9, 2012, at 5. 
112 Peggy Sito & Ng Kang-chung, Developers Want Luxury Flats to be Exempt from Tax, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (HK), Nov. 24, 2012, at 3 (the purported reasons was “unhealthy” government intervention in the property 
market and the harm of reputation among international investors). 
113 Ng & Li, supra note 16. 
114 Joyce Ng, Call to Leave Local-owned Companies out of 15pc Tax, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Feb. 1, 
2013, at 1. 
115 Under the institutional design of the Hong Kong legislature, there are group of members who are elected from a 
defined electorate that is typically based on profession or industry: Lam Wai-man, Hong Kong: The Hong Kong 
Legislative Council – Where Politics Matters More than Size, in LEGISLATURES OF SMALL STATES: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 137, 141-142 (Nicholas D. J. Baldwin ed., Routledge 2013); Albert Chen, Development of Representative 
Government, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 215, 243 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011). For more analysis on the political infrastructure and dynamic in Hong Kong, see infra V.C.2.  
116 Luisa Tam, Home Truth, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Dec. 5, 2012, at 48 (Supplements). 
117 Sandy Li, New Property Taxes Still in Limbo, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Oct. 9, 2013, at 1 (Property). 
118 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Issues Raised at the Meetings of the Bills 
Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 8 July 2013, July, 2013, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 
1618/12-13(02); Li, supra note 117; Ng Kang-chung, Cooling Measures ‘Unfair to Locals’, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (HK), Sep. 17, 2013, at 5. 
119 Ng Kang-chung, Property Sector Turns to Radicals in Tax Fight, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Sep. 16, 
2013, at 4. 
120 See Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Issues Raised at the Meetings of the Bills 
Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 16 September 2013, Sep., 2013, LegCo Paper No: 
CB(1) 1843/12-13(02); Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 118. 
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existing requirement of permanent resident status—for exemption from the BSD. 121  The 
administration rejected such a requirement based on the administrative difficulties in evaluating 
the context-sensitive issues of domicile.122 Some lawmakers also suggested excluding from the 
BSD exemption Hong Kong permanent residents who were minors but whose parents were not 
Hong Kong permanent residents. 123  This proposal was again rejected due to concerns of 
discriminatory effects against the targeted Hong Kong permanent residents that might infringe on 
the right to equality. 124  Nonetheless, a follow-up recommendation to exclude all permanent 
residents who were minors was eventually taken up by the government in January 2014.125 This 
proposal did raise concerns about whether this withdrawal of the exemption should be 
retrospectively applied to the date of announcement given the substantial departure from the 
initial announcement. 126  The government insisted on full retrospective effect based on the 
purported concerns of circumvention and narrowly survived an attempted amendment by that 
would have rendered this withdrawal prospective.127 
Two other significant but politically less salient changes were made to the final 
legislation as a result of the legislative process. The first change related to the exemption for 
redevelopment, wherein the government indicated in its announcement that purchases of 
property by developers for the purpose of redevelopment would be exempted from the BSD.128 
The proposed six-year limitation under the Bill was dropped in favor of requiring demonstrable 
evidence of redevelopment for a refund of the BSD—a change that would potentially allow for a 
speedier refund process.129 The second change concerned the scope of exemptions for a non-
                                                 
121  Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Draft Committee Stage Amendments 
Proposed by the Hon Kenneth Leung, Nov., 2013, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 337/13-14(01). 
122 Id. 
123 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at the Meetings of the Bills 
Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 15 October 2013, Oct., 2013, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 
133/13-14(2). 
124 Id. 
125 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Committee Stage Amendment Proposed by the 
Hon Regina IP, Jan., 2014, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 623/13-14(04). This is achieved by changing the exemptions 
dealing with non-permanent residents acting as trustee or guardian of Hong Kong permanent resident from “the 
other person is a Hong Kong permanent resident and is either a minor or a mentally incapacitated person” to “the 
other person is a Hong Kong permanent resident and is a mentally incapacitated person”: see §29CB(8)(b), 
29CB(9)(b), 29DB(9)(b) & 29DB(10)(b), Stamp Duty Ordinance, supra note 91; §10 & 13, Stamp Duty 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2014, Ord. No. 2 of 2014 (HK) & §9 & 12, Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 (HK). 
126 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Feb. 19, 2014, 7302. 
127 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 – Committee Stage – Hon Dennis Kwok’s 2nd Amendment to Clause 17, 
Feb. 21, 2014, Vote 13 (a margin of one vote among the 27 Functional LegCo members and 24 Geographical LegCo 
members). 
128  Ng & Li, supra note 16; Yvonne Liu, Sino Land Plans Unaffected by Cooling Measures, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (HK), Nov. 1, 2012, at 1 (Business). 
129 See §29DD, Stamp Duty Ordinance, supra note 91; §13, Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, supra note 
125; §12, Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 (HK). 
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Hong Kong permanent resident who purchased a replacement property after the resident’s initial 
residential property was involuntarily sold.130 The exemption was expanded to cover a broader 
spectrum of circumstances after the government accepted the submissions of the Law Society of 
Hong Kong.131  
 Delay in the legislative process, partly due to the unrelated filibuster by opposition 
lawmakers but mainly due to the lack of agreement among the legislators on the substantive rules, 
resulted in the Bill being stuck in the legislative process for fifteen months following the 
announcement of the tax measures.132 The government’s intense lobbying and political jostling 
among the political parties in the legislature culminated in extended three-day marathon sessions 
for the second and third readings of the relevant bill that had commentators raving with 
speculation about the prospect of the Bill’s passage.133 Indeed, as the scheduled date for the 
second and third readings of the Bill drew closer, a final issue emerged as the dominant political 
talking point—namely, the provision that would empower the Financial Secretary to make any 
future changes to the rates of the BSD and SSD by unilateral announcement in the Gazette 
without the need for additional legislative authorization. 134  This empowerment provision 
attracted allegations of “administrative tyranny” and threats to veto the entire Bill by certain 
political parties.135 The government attempted to placate the objections with a last minute “oral 
undertaking” to still consult the legislature for upward revisions of rates,136 which only served to 
                                                 
130 Transport and Housing Bureau, The Administration’s Response to the Issues Raised at the Meeting of the Bills 
Committee on the Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 Held on 20 May 2013 and the Submission from the Law 
Society of Hong Kong of 28 May 2013, June, 2013, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 1288/12-13(01). 
131 Id. The initial version only provides for compulsory acquisitions pursuant to the Urban Renewal Authority 
Ordinance, Lands Resumption Ordinance and Land (Compulsory Sale for Redevelopment) Ordinance, and was 
expanded in the final version to further includes the Mass Transit Railway (Land Resumption and Related 
Provisions) Ordinance, Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Railways Ordinance, Land Acquisition 
(Possessory Title) Ordinance and Land Drainage Ordinance: see §29CB(4) & 29(DB)(5), Stamp Duty Ordinance, 
supra note 91 (HK); §10 & 13, Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, supra note 125 & §9 & 12, Stamp Duty 
(Amendment) Bill 2012 (HK). 
132 Yongsi, supra note 17; Filibuster of Property Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of 
Tax, supra note 20; Li, supra note 117. 
133 Zhang Weiwei, “Shuangla” erdu, gangfu jianjue “chuangguan” [Second Reading of “Double Cooling Measures” 
– Government Insistence to Push Ahead], SINGTAO DAILY, Feb. 19, 2014, at A8; Shuanglazhao xiuding nan 
guoguan [Amendment of Double Cooling Measures Unlikely to Pass], HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Feb. 11, 
2014, at A1. 
134 §16, Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 (HK). Under the current administrative law framework, the LegCo will 
be presented with the subsidiary legislation (the definition which includes the notice to change the rates) in the 
earliest opportunity and may by resolution amend or repeal the subsidiary legislation: §34, Interpretation and 
General Clauses Ordinance, c. 1 (1997) (HK).  
135 Amendment of Double Cooling Measures Unlikely to Pass, supra note 133; Yinhua shui xiuding yiyuan chang 
xian shenyi hou dingli [Amendment to Stamp Duty – LegCo Member Urges Legislative Review Before 
Implementation], HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Feb. 5, 2014, at A10. 
136 Zhang, supra note 133. 
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generate even more controversies. 137  Ultimately, the Bill, with the three changes to the 
exemptions of redevelopment, replacement and Hong Kong permanent residents minors 
discussed above, was finally passed on February 22, 2014, and was registered in the Gazette 
(thus becoming law) on February 28, 2014.138 
D. The Aftermath: Real Effect of the Yet Effective Law 
Despite the BSD amendment’s languishing in the legislative process for more than a year 
after the announcement, the impact of the measures was keenly and immediately felt by all 
relevant parties from the announcement date. First, lawyers handling property transactions began 
collecting these pending taxes for eventual possible payment to the government.139 This move 
resulted in funds amounting to several billion HKD being held up in the client accounts of these 
law firms.140  
Other private actors similarly modified their behavior in response to the pending law. 
Some developers offered discounts designed to partially or completely offset the pending 
increase in the tax burden.141 Other developers increased the commission to property agents to 
help push the inventory. 142  New land sales understandably saw more conservative bids. 143 
Developers also changed the design of new projects—such as reducing the number of “super 
luxury” features—in anticipation of the dampened interest by cash-rich foreign buyers. 144 
                                                 
137 The real controversy surrounding the “oral undertaking” is more political than the purported concerns for rule of 
law and/or separation of power. The oral undertaking was given in response to the legislators from the pro-
establishment political parties, which infuriated the rival pan-democrats political parties over the perceived 
preferential treatment by the government to the pro-establishment camp. The pan-democrats threatened to block the 
Bill in its entirety, but ultimately chose to boycott the vote (which effectively facilitate the passage) given the strong 
popular support for the Bill: Fanmin lichang cucheng yian guoguan zhengfu chanshen [Bill Passed With Absence of 
Pan-Democrats – A Pyrrhic Victory for the Government], HONG KONG ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Feb. 24, 2014, at A4; 
Liang, supra note 17. For discussion of the antagonistic political landscape in Hong Kong, see infra IV.C.2. 
138 Stamp Duty (Amendment) Ordinance 2014, supra note 17; Liang, supra note 17. 
139 Filibuster of Property Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of Tax, supra note 20; Li, 
supra note 117. 
140 Financial Secretary Warning: Vetoing Cooling Measures Would Result in Tumor in Property and Stock Market,  
supra note 20; Filibuster of Property Cooling Measures Causes Backlog of Several Hundred Millions of Tax, supra 
note 20. 
141 Kenneth Ko, Sweet Deals, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Nov. 1, 2013, at 1 (Supplements); Sandy Li, 
Rivalry Fuels Fears over Price Cuts, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Oct. 12, 2013, at 1 (Business) (50% of 
BSD for Yoo Residence); Paggie Leung, supra note 18 (15% discount by Cheung Kong (Holdings) for remaining 
flats at Uptown in Yuen Long).  
142 Peggy Sito, Tax Takes Huge Toll on Sales, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Dec. 21, 2012, at 1 (Business) (5% 
from the previous 1% to 2.5%). 
143 Liu, supra note 19; Li, supra note 19. 
144 Li, supra note 18. 
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Redevelopment plans by private developers were derailed by the increase in upfront costs of 
acquisition and the reduction in demand of the output.145 
Foreign buyers explored measures for avoiding the taxes, such as purchasing property via 
share transfers (if the property was owned by a company), although there were additional 
transaction costs to verify the account and liability of the property-holding company.146 This 
practice was also adopted by some developers for their remaining unsold apartments.147 There 
was also a shift in investment to industrial and commercial properties, which were not affected 
by the BSD and SSD.148  
Overall, the “yet to be implemented” BSD and SSD were effective in cooling the 
property market. The previous trend of rising prices on secondary homes was halted amidst a 
substantial decline in transaction volume.149  
 
IV. LEGALITY OF LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE  
One interesting observation from the case study is the absence of any qualms about the 
legality of how the measures were implemented.150 There was some discussion about the legality 
of the substantive content of the BSD: Tom Holland opined that the BSD might be 
discriminatory and infringed on the Basic Law article 105’s right of the freedom to acquire, use 
and dispose of property; 151  Abraham Razack suggested a possible violation of equality 
protection;152 and the Hong Kong Conveyancing & Property Law Association Limited argued 
that the BSD restricted the policy of free trade and contravened articles 105, 106 and 115 of the 
                                                 
145 Jimmy Chow, Chang of Pace, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Jan. 18, 2013, at 14 (Business) (while an 
exemption would be granted for redevelopment that is completed within 6 years upon acquisition, it is in the form of 
a refund, meaning that a substantial amount of capital will be locked up). 
146 Joyce Ng & Sandy Li, Curb on Avoiding New Flat Still Leaves Tax Dodges, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), 
Nov. 1, 2012, at 3. 
147  Yishou haozai chaizhao bi qianwan yinghua sui [Avoidance of Tens of Millions of Stamp Duty Via 
Countermeasures In First Hand Sales of Luxury Property], MINGPAO (HK), Oct. 30, 2012. 
148 Peggy Sito, Boom in Factory Space Investors, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Jan. 30, 2013, at 1 (Property); 
Shu-ching Jean Chen, Leung Firm on Reining in HK Property Prices, BUSINESS TIMES (Sing.), Dec. 7, 2012.  
149 Li, supra note 21; Sito & Ng, supra note 21. Property agents were particularly hard-hit by the substantial fall in 
property transactions, with several organized public protests by the affected property agents: Peggy Sito, Realty 
Strikes, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), July 5, 2013, at 4 (Business). 
150 During the 2011 legislative debate over SSD, Dr Margaret Ng did mount a substantial objection over the 
retrospective nature of the SSD implementation. Nonetheless, the objections was based on normative policy 
considerations (delay and uncertainty) rather than on legal grounds: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong), June 22, 2011, 12561-12564. 
151 Tom Holland, Four More Ways Officials Break the Spirit of HK’s Basic Law, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(HK), Nov. 23, 2012, at 12 (Business). 
152 Ng, supra note 118. 
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Basic Law.153 Beyond the legality of the substantive aspects,154 the issue of retrospectivity has 
largely been ignored in the discussion of the BSD. Interestingly, the Law Society did raise the 
“question of the constitutionality of making the SSD legislation retrospective” during the SSD 
debate in 2011, but there was no further elaboration or argument beyond that passing 
comment.155  
This Part critically examines the legality of the manner in which the BSD was 
implemented as follows: first, by setting out the constitutional framework in Hong Kong; second, 
by analyzing the issue of retrospectivity, including a discussion of previous examples of 
retrospective laws in Hong Kong; and third, by examining the ancillary issue of the power to tax. 
The conclusion is that legislation by press release is legally permissible in Hong Kong.       
A. Constitutional Framework in Hong Kong 
The starting point for assessing legality is naturally the constitutional document of a 
jurisdiction that sets forth fundamental rights. In Hong Kong, there are actually three possible 
instruments that are relevant. The first is the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s de facto constitution after 
the handover from British colonial rule to China in 1997.156 The second is the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights Ordinance, enacted in 1991 to incorporate the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [“ICCPR”]  into Hong Kong157 after the Tiananmen Square “incident” in China 
sparked concerns about future human rights protections after the handover. 158  The third 
instrument is the ICCPR itself, which “as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force” under 
article 39 of the Basic Law.159 The precise relationship between these three instruments is a 
complicated and, at times, controversial issue for courts determining the substantive content of 
the constitutional rights or assessing the legality of restrictions on rights.160 As a general matter, 
either the Basic Law or the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance will suffice in providing 
                                                 
153 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 110. 
154 It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the alleged severity of legal critique, there has been no indication or 
suggestion of any prospective litigation by anyone.   
155 Law Society of Hong Kong, Preliminary Submissions by the Law Society’s Property Committee on the Stamp 
Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010, Jan. 4, 2011, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 983/10-11(01), at 9.  
156 Chan, supra note 80, at 28-29. 
157 Long Title, Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 22. 
158 Carole J. Petersen, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong: A Case for the Strategic Use of 
Human Rights Treaties and the International Reporting Process, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 28, 42-46 (2013); 
Dinusha Panditaratne, Basic Law, Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG 
CONSTITUTION 425, 431-432 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., Sweet & Maxwell 2011). 
159 Art. 39, Basic Law (1997) (HK). 
160 For a concise overview and analysis of this issue, see Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 436-460; PETER WESLEY-
SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 319-327 (Longman Asia Limited 2nd ed. 1994). 
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grounds for a constitutional challenge,161 whereas the ICCPR may serve as a constraint against 
repeal or amendment of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance without providing an 
independent source of enforceable rights itself.162 
B. Retrospectivity  
1. Per Se Prohibition of Retrospective Criminal Law  
The relevant provision on retrospective law is contained in article 12 of the Hong Kong 
Bill of Rights Ordinance. A direct replica of article 15 of the ICCPR, the provision is titled “No 
retrospective criminal offences or penalties” and stipulates that “No one shall be held guilty of 
any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal 
offence, under Hong Kong or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal 
offence was committed.” This right against retrospective criminal offenses or penalties has no 
counterpart in the Basic Law,163 although, as noted in the preceding section, this fact provides no 
obstacle for the courts in striking down retrospective punitive legislative provisions.164  
The protection from retrospective laws is, however, limited only to criminal sanctions, as 
is clear from a plain reading of article 12 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (or, for that 
matter, the international human right standards set forth in ICCPR). Inevitably, there are 
ambiguity and uncertainty on the margin as to what constitutes a “criminal offense” or “penalty.” 
In Hong Kong, the higher appellate courts have not had the opportunity to pass judgment on this 
issue,165 and only two somewhat inconsistent lower court decisions have done so. The first is a 
High Court decision that found the disqualification of a driver’s license upon the accumulation of 
certain traffic demerit points to be mere civil consequences of a criminal offence and thus did not 
constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes (i.e., article 11(6) Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
                                                 
161 Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 441-444; Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim, Interpreting Constitutional Rights and 
Permissible Restrictions, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 465, 470-471 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 
Sweet & Maxwell 2011); Simon N. M. Young, Restricting Basic Law Rights in Hong Kong, 34 HONG KONG L. J. 
109, 115-117 (2004). 
162 Panditaratne, supra note 158, at 441-442 & 456-460; Young, supra note 161, at 115-117. 
163 See art. 24-42, Basic Law (1997) (HK). 
164 E.g., Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration, [1999] HKEC 315, 350-352 (C.F.A.) (The offending statue is an 
amendment to the Immigration Ordinance that impose a new requirement of an administrative certificate for the 
exercise of the right of abode by certain class of permanent residence, thereby rendering persons without such 
certificate liable for immigration – i.e. criminal – offences. The amendment was enacted on July 10, 1997 but 
deemed to be of effective on July 1, 1997, the date of the handover). See also R v Chan Suen Hay, [1995] HKLY 
205 (D.C.) (relying on article 12(1) of the Bills of Rights Ordinance to disallow an application for disqualification 
order under a Companies Ordinance provision that was enacted six years after the commission of the offense).  
165 The Ng Ka Ling case is the major case turns up in the Westlaw search on cases which rules on the retrospective 
criminal law issues. In that case, both parties did not dispute that immigration offences would fall under the ambit of 
the prohibition, and the main contention is simply whether the offending provision will be struck down or that the 
provision stands but retrospective prosecution prohibited: Ng Ka Ling, supra note 164, at 350-352. 
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Ordinance).166 The other is a subsequent District Court decision, which held that a director 
disqualification order under the Companies Ordinance is a penalty that cannot be imposed if the 
triggering criminal offense was committed before the enactment of the relevant Companies 
Ordinance provision.167 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights and U.S. courts have 
grappled with difficult cases such as whether confiscation of property from convicted drug 
traffickers, mandatory sex offender registration, indefinite civil confinement for “dangerous” sex 
offenders and other legal sanctions violate the ban on retrospective criminal laws.168 Nonetheless, 
the general consensus among various jurisdictions is that taxation per se does not fall under the 
ambit of such a ban.169  
2. Expanded Notion of “Law” and Proportionality 
 Notwithstanding the lack of per se prohibition against retrospective civil legislation, such 
legislation may still be scrutinized by the courts under judicial review of general constitutionality. 
In Hong Kong,170 as with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights171 and 
Canada,172 legislation must conform to both the principles of legality and the requirement of 
proportionality. The principle of legality arose from “prescribed by law” and similar phrases that 
commonly precondition any imposition of legal burdens (including taxes) on private entities. 
Courts have increasingly infused a qualitative requirement in interpreting what constitutes “law” 
beyond the formality of a duly enacted piece of legislation or regulation. The European Court of 
Human Rights construed the term “law” to require “qualitative requirements, including those of 
                                                 
166 The Queen v Wan Kit-man, [1992] 1 HKCLR 225 (H.C.). 
167 R, supra note 164. In reaching the conclusion, HH Judge Britton distinguished the Wan Kit-man case on the 
basis that the director disqualification order is discretionary, unlike the automatic disqualification of driver license in 
Wan Kit-man. This is notwithstanding the absence of any suggestion in the Wan Kit-man case that the “automatic” 
nature of the disqualification has any bearings in the court’s finding. 
168 Short answer, respectively, yes (European Court of Human Rights); no (European Court of Human Rights and 
U.S. Supreme Court); no (U.S. Supreme Court): see SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 135-141. For a detailed exposition 
on EU jurisprudence on article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which is similar to article 15 of the 
ICCPR, see ROBIN C A WHITE & CLARE OVERY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 296-304 (Oxford 
University Press 5th ed. 2010); DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 331-
339 (Oxford University Press 2nd ed. 2009). 
169 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 151-156 (discussing the cases from various jurisdictions); Pauwels, supra note 7, at 
272-273; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1066; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 261 (“Tax is not a penalty for earning 
income, nor is there any social disapproval attaching to the fact that a demand for unpaid taxes has been made.”). 
170 Chan & Lim, supra note 161, at 487-495. 
171 A W BRADLEY & K D EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 681-682 (Pearson Education 15th ed. 
2011); WHITE & OVERY, supra note 168, at 312-315, 325-332 & 478; ALEX  CARROLL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 398-400 (Pearson 5th ed. 2009); STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 201-213 (Cambridge University Press 2006). For a critical 
discussion of the legal theory imbedded in these two concepts, see GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION 
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 17-36 & 99-119 (Oxford University Press 2007). 
172 Barb Billingsley, Justification, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY AND PRINCIPLES 837, 837-860  
(Leonard I. Rotman ed., Thomson 2008); PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 797-803 & 828-829 
(Thomson 5th ed. Student ed. 2007). 
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accessibility and foreseeability.” 173  A similar approach has been adopted in Hong Kong as 
well. 174  While more typically used to critically evaluate regulatory/legislative schemes that 
accord broad discretionary power to government officials,175 this requirement of accessibility and 
foreseeability provides a potential avenue for courts to examine retrospective civil legislation in 
the absence of an express constitutional prohibition. Sir Anthony Mason, a non-permanent Judge 
of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
opined in his academic writing on the possibility of a greater operation of the general principle of 
legality under the ICCPR in challenges to retrospective laws.176 Indeed, the European Court of 
Human Rights occasionally scrutinizes retroactive tax legislation with respect to whether it is a 
“lawful” interference.177  
Alternatively, the use of retrospectivity may be a factor that weighs against the principle 
of proportionality. This view is similarly reflected in certain decisions by the European Court of 
Human Rights involving retrospective tax legislation.178 For example, in M.A. v Finland, the 
court held that the key issue is whether “the retrospective application of the law imposed an 
unreasonable burden on [the applicants] and thereby failed to strike a fair balance between the 
various interests involved.”179 Significantly, in R.Sz. v Hungary, the hardship caused to private 
individuals who are likely to exhaust monies that are subsequently subjected to retrospective 
taxation was an aggravating factor, in addition to the magnitude of the tax, in the court’s finding 
that the tax was not reasonably proportionate.180   
Nonetheless, the prospective notice setting out the specifics of the pending retrospective 
laws under legislation by press release is likely to substantially meet these two legal 
requirements. Although private individuals may not be able to access laws that have yet to be 
passed and thus are unable to foresee the legal consequences imposed by future retrospective 
                                                 
173 WHITE & OVERY, supra note 168, at 312-315; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 168, at 334; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 
51-52. 
174 Chan & Lim, supra note 161, at 488-489. For cases applying this approach, see Winnie Lo v HKSAR, (2012) 15 
HKCFAR 16, 42-44 (C.F.A.); Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR, [2002] 2 HKLRD 793, 810-812 (C.F.A.). 
175 Chan & Lim, supra note 161, at 488-489; WHITE & OVERY, supra note 168, at 314-315; HOGG, supra note 172, 
at 799-801. 
176 Mason, supra note 23, at 314-315. Earlier, he has entrenched this expanded notion of “law” in a Court of Final 
Appeal case: Shum Kwok Sher v HKSAR, supra note 174, 810-812. 
177 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 272; Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 273; Bernitz, supra note 3, at 50-52. See also Nolte & 
Radler, supra note 45, at 495 (noting how under German constitutional court jurisprudence, laws which affects 
transactions that have been concluded “are usually impermissible because they violate the principle of legal certainty, 
which is an aspect … of the general principle of the rule of law). 
178 For a discussion of the relevant cases, see Pauwels, supra note 7, at 276-279. See Nolte & Radler, supra note 45, 
at 495 (discussing the treatment of retrospectivity in assessing proportionality by the German Constitutional Court). 
See also Gribnau, supra note 31, at 71 (arguing that retrospectivity, while generally undesirable, can be 
countervailed by competing interests). 
179 M.A. v Finland, No. 27793/95, June 10, 2003, 11 (ECtHR). 
180 R.Sz. v Hungary, No. 41838/11, July 2, 2013, ¶59 (ECtHR). 
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legislation, the same cannot be said when the private individuals are forewarned by the initial 
announcement. For the BSD, private individuals were able to refer to the detailed 
implementation guidelines uploaded on the government website181 and could not claim surprise 
at the eventual tax bill, especially given that they would have been amply informed of the 
pending tax by property agents and the lawyer handling the conveyance. Similarly, by 
minimizing the disruption of the reliance interests of private individuals, the announcement 
served as an effective counterweight to the adverse effect of retrospectivity on the 
proportionality balancing test.182 In this regard, it is worth noting that, in M.A. v Finland, where 
the retrospective application of the tax legislation had no difficulty passing the proportionality 
assessment, the court found it significant that the retrospective effect was only backdated to the 
introduction of the bill.183 
3. Presumption Against Retrospectivity 
 Although the presumption against retrospectivity is not strictly a legal prohibition capable 
of striking down the law, it is worth mentioning for completeness that civil legislation will 
nevertheless be subjected to this well-established common law principle in statutory 
interpretation.184 The presumption has been invoked several times in Hong Kong courts185 and is 
also reflected in the statutory provision on the interpretation of statutory repeal.186 Nonetheless, it 
is not strictly applicable to legislation by press release because its retrospective effects will 
typically be expressly and clearly stipulated. Indeed, the preamble187 and the first clause188 of the 
bill implementing the BSD could not have been more explicit about the intended retrospective 
operation of the amendment.  
4. Previous Examples of Retrospective Laws 
Given the general legality of retrospective non-criminal laws in Hong Kong, it is not 
surprising that there has not been any systematic study of the quantity and characteristics of 
                                                 
181 The policy announcement of the BSD was accompanied by a detailed FAQ posted online on the website of the 
Inland Revenue Department that sets out the specifics of the legislation: see http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2013). 
182 Pauwels, supra note 7, at 278.  
183 M.A., supra note 179, at 12. 
184 JURATOWITCH, supra note 2, at 68-71; Salembier, supra note 3, at 112-118. 
185 E.g., Lee Bing Chueng v Secretary for Justice, [2013] HKEC 255, para 145-146 & 155 (C.F.I.); The Queen v 
Lam Wan-kow and Yuen Chun-kong, [1992] 1 HKCLR 272, 277 (C.A.); Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chan 
Tin-chu, [1965] District Court Law Reports 289, 301 (District Court). 
186 §23, Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, supra note 134. 
187 Preamble, Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 (HK) (“to impose buyer’s stamp duty on certain agreements for 
sale and conveyances on sale of residential property executed on or after 27 October 2012”) 
188 Clause 1(2), Stamp Duty (Amendment) Bill 2012 (HK) (“This Ordinance is deemed to have come into operation 
on 27 October 2012”). 
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retrospective laws in Hong Kong.189 This section provides a brief descriptive overview of some 
previous examples of retrospective laws in Hong Kong. These examples are not meant to be 
comprehensive, although they are significant, given that all of these examples were provided by 
the government in response to recent queries by legislators on the issue of retrospectivity. The 
examination of these examples not only provides a more circumspect context in which to 
examine Hong Kong’s utilization of legislation by press release in particular and retrospective 
laws in general but also helps us appreciate the significant departure posed by the BSD that will 
be discussed in the V.B.  
Although retrospectivity was not raised in the BSD, the issue was raised in the initial 
implementation of the SSD in 2010. The Law Society of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong 
Association of Banks opposed the retrospective effect of the amendment. 190  Pursuant to a 
meeting on February 9, 2011, in which the question of “existing ordinances other than revenue 
ordinances which had retrospective effect” was raised, the Bills Committee responsible for the 
stamp duty amendment responded with two examples: the Societies Ordinance in 1988 and the 
Bankruptcy Ordinance in 2005.191 The latter is uncontroversial—a mere example of adaptive 
amendments to update the reference of government officials and procedure to account for the 
handover in 1997. 192  The former, despite being deemed to have come into operation 
approximately ten years earlier, is also relatively routine because it merely gave effect to a 
legislative amendment of a different piece of legislation (Companies Ordinance) from ten years 
earlier, which, due to a drafting oversight, had not been correspondingly reflected in the 
Societies Ordinance.193   
The examples of the Societies Ordinance and the Bankruptcy Ordinance were in addition 
to the prior list of existing revenue ordinances that had retrospective effects.194 Essentially, there 
were the amendments to the Inland Revenue Ordinance in 1987 and 1992. The 1987 amendment 
concerned the inclusion of consideration in exchange for the right to receive income from 
property as a taxable trading receipt195  but did not attract any discussion of retrospectivity, 
                                                 
189 C.f., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 104-164 (a study that focuses on Australia, but also include U.S. and U.K.); 
Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3 (Australia). 
190 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 49, at 18. See also Dr Margaret Ng’s 
speech in the LegCo debate that focused on the criticizing the retrospective aspects of the SSD: Official Reports of 
Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), June 22, 2011, 12561-12564. 
191 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 47. 
192 Id. See §§ 1, 12, 19 & 32, Bankruptcy Ordinance, c. 6 (1997) (HK). 
193 The Companies Ordinance was amended to permitted large partnership to engage in professional services such as 
lawyers and accountants, but without the corresponding amendment to the Societies Ordinance, those would be still  
illegal: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), July 6, 1988, 1783-1785. See also 
Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), July 20, 1988, 1982-1983 (discussing the 
implication of how the “legalization,” while retrospectively applied to ten years ago, did not affect litigation that has 
already commenced). 
194 Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2010 Bills Committee, supra note 48, at 2. 
195 §15A, Inland Revenue Ordinance, c. 112 (2012) (HK). 
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notwithstanding the three-month lapse between the policy announcement and its eventual 
enactment.196 The 1992 amendment involved the closing of two tax-avoidance mechanisms—
namely, expenditures on intellectual property rights and leveraged leasing of ships and 
aircraft.197 It did give rise to a discussion of retrospectivity, wherein the government agreed to 
exempt “small ticket leasing” from retrospective application of the law because the earlier 
announcement statement did not clearly spell out its application to “small ticket leasing.”198  
Interestingly, a more extensive list was provided in the course of the debate about the 
retrospective nature of the Family Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill in 2000, in which the 
amendment designed to clarify the original legislative intent (i.e., that the selective offering of 
benefits to immediate family members of employees is not illegal, contrary to some legal 
opinions) was made to be retrospective to the date of the original legislation, though without 
affecting existing litigation.199 In addition to the Societies Ordinance amendment in 1988 and the 
Inland Revenue Ordinance amendment in 1992, the list also included the Immigration Ordinance 
amendment in 1991, the Land Tribunal Ordinance amendment in 1995 and the Employees’ 
Compensation Ordinance amendment in 2000.200 
The Lands Tribunal Ordinance amendment resembles the Family Status (Discrimination) 
Ordinance insofar as the amendment was made to clarify a clause—here being the jurisdiction of 
the Lands Tribunal over orders for vacant possession on termination of tenancies—and passed 
without any concern about its retrospective application.201 Similarly, the new provision s13D(5) 
in the Immigration Ordinance amendment was made to remove any doubt as to the legal 
authority of the Director of Immigration to transfer Vietnamese detainees between detention 
centers, though without affecting legal proceedings that had already begun.202 
                                                 
196 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), May. 27, 1987, 1659 & 1675-1676. 
197 §16E, 22B & 39E, Inland Revenue Ordinance, supra note 195. 
198 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Mar. 11, 1992. Leasing of planes and ships 
are considered “big ticket leasing”, while “small ticket leasing” typically involves machineries and equipment that 
are of considerably less monetary value.  
199 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), June 14, 2010, 7550-7553. See generally 
Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, c. 527 (2013) (HK). 
200 C M Wong, Family Status Discrimination (Amendment) Bill 2000, May 16, 2000, LegCo Paper No: CB(2) 
2015/99-00(01). 
201  Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Nov. 29, 1995; Official Reports of 
Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Nov. 2, 1995 (the amendment was meant to reverse a 1993 Court 
of Appeal decision). See §8(8), Lands Tribunal Ordinance, c. 17 (1997) (HK). 
202 There was no objection based on the retrospective effect: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of 
Hong Kong), May 29, 1991. See §13D(5), Immigration Ordinance, c. 115 (1997) (HK) (“For the avoidance of doubt, 
it is hereby declared that any person detained under subsection (1) in any place may, under the authority of the 
Director of Immigration, be transferred from that place and detained in any other place or places specified by the 
Director of Immigration.”).  
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The Employees’ Compensation Ordinance is uncontroversial. Resembling the drafting 
oversight that drove the amendment to the Societies Ordinance in 1988, the definition of “gale 
warning” and “rainstorm warning” under section 5(4)(f) was restored to its original meaning (to 
include red warning) in line with the previous definition, which was based on another statute that 
had been inadvertently altered when the latter, referencing the statute, was amended for a 
different policy consideration.203    
C. Taxing Power 
As is typical with the constitutional structure of other nations,204 article 73 of the Basic 
Law provides that the power to “approve taxation” and “enact, amend or repeal laws” is vested 
in the legislative branch (i.e., the Legislative Council),205 though laws relating to government 
policies are primarily introduced by the executive branch.206 Prior written approval of the Chief 
Executive207 is required before members of the Legislative Council can introduce such bills.208 
 The vesting of the taxing powers and general legislative powers in the legislative branch 
means that the executive branch did not have any legal basis to collect the tax before the 
amendments were actually passed. Indeed, this is what happened in practice. As explained by the 
Secretary for Transport and Housing in the first reading of the 2010 amendment implementing 
the SSD, “[b]efore the new law comes into effect, the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) will 
record the residential property transactions between 20 November 2010 and the date of coming 
into effect of the new law to identify the cases liable for SSD. Demand notes on SSD will then be 
issued after the new legislation is enacted. And during this period, the IRD will continue to allow 
and approve applications for deferring stamp duty payment on agreements made in accordance 
                                                 
203 The referencing statue, the Judicial Proceedings (Adjournment During Gale Warnings) Ordinance (c. 62), was 
amended to minimize disruption to the judicial process without intending to affect general employment. The 
amendment of Employee’s Compensation Ordinance was retrospectively made effective on the date the referencing 
statue was amended: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Apr. 5, 2000, 5749-5750; 
Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Feb. 16, 2010, 3899-3900. 
204 See Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738 (observing the legal and political foundation of the doctrine); BRADLEY & 
EWING, supra note 171, at 347-348 (discussing the authority for taxation in the U.K.); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 280-283 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed., 2005) (discussing the extent of U.S. Congress’s taxing 
power).  
205 See Cullen et al., supra note 87, at 326-328 (discussing the Legislative Council role in budget and fiscal control). 
206 Art. 62, Basic Law (HK). 
207 Under Hong Kong current political institution arrangement, the Chief Executive is the head of government, akin 
to the Governor of Hong Kong under British colonial rule: see Benny Tai, The Chief Executive, in LAW OF THE 
HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 181 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., Sweet & Maxwell 2011) (discussing the 
appointment and powers of the Chief Executive). 
208 Art. 74, Basic Law (HK). 
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with the prevailing legislation, until the new law comes into effect.” 209 A similar arrangement 
was provided for the BSD.210 
 Interestingly, members of the executive branch publicly acknowledged the role of the 
legislature in authorizing such statutory measures,211 even if there was a certain irony when the 
Financial Secretary observed that “[g]iven the effectiveness of the Special Stamp Duty, I hope 
Members will pass the Bill as soon as possible so that the Government can proceed with the 
initiative” (emphasis added). 212  There is a little cognitive dissonance in discussing the 
demonstrated effectiveness of a measure that is supposedly yet to be enacted.    
D. Summary: Legislation by Press Release is Legal 
In summary, the use of legislation by press release to implement the BSD and other 
property cooling taxations is legal in Hong Kong. The constitutional prohibition against 
retrospective laws is only limited to criminal sanctions, and the provision of a detailed 
announcement would have survived an expansive interpretation of the legality and 
proportionality principle. As evidenced by the numerous past examples of retrospective laws, 
including a couple of legislation by press release, there is no legal prohibition of retrospective 
non-criminal laws in general and legislation by press release in particular. The postponing of the 
tax collection until legislative enactment, while maintaining a record of taxable transactions in 
the meantime, also navigates around the formal legislative requirements for tax implementation. 
Thus, notwithstanding the murmurs about the issue of “constitutionality,”213 the practice is legal 
not only in Hong Kong but also in most other jurisdictions that do not have an explicit 
prohibition on retrospective civil legislation.  
In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that the political controversy over the inclusion of 
the empowering provision to allow the Financial Secretary to make immediate legal changes to 
the rates of the BSD and SSD 214  is ultimately a red herring. Without the benefit of the 
empowering section in the Bill or any other laws, the initial October 2012 announcement was a 
mere government policy announcement that did not have any formal legal effect. However, this 
lack of formal legal effect posed no obstacle to the announcement’s real and direct effects on the 
property market. The announced retrospectivity of the pending legal changes was more than 
                                                 
209 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Dec. 8, 2010, 3442-3443. 
210 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100 (“ IRD will record all the residential property transactions 
between 27 October 2012 and the date on which the new law comes into effect, and demand notes for the SSD 
underpaid / BSD will be issued after the new legislation is enacted.”). 
211 E.g., Secretary for Transport and Housing: “I look forward to the early passage of the Bill by the Council to give 
legal effect to these stamp duty related proposals”: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong 
Kong), Dec. 8, 2010, 3442-3443. 
212 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Apr. 13 2011, 9158. 
213 Supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
214 Supra III.C. 
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sufficient to achieve immediate de facto legal effects. Concerns about “administrative tyranny” 
would have to be addressed through reforming the legal status of retrospective laws rather than 
the mere fixation of a particular empowering provision.   
 
V. TOWARDS BETTER LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE 
Although the practice of legislation by press release is generally legal in most 
jurisdictions, the normative considerations of the practice are more nuanced. As discussed above 
in Part II.C., there are important merits and shortcomings associated with the practice. This Part 
identifies and examines the three criteria that are instrumental in assessing whether the use of 
legislation by press release in a particular circumstance is normatively justified.   
A. Certainty and Consistency with an Initial Announcement 
Given that legislation by press release is designed to mitigate the otherwise unjust 
disruption of individuals’ reliance on the law arising from the retrospectivity of the law, it is 
relatively obvious that an example of well-executed legislation by press release would require 
that its initial announcement set out the pending law with sufficient clarity and that any 
substantial deviations in the eventual legislation should not be retrospectively applied. In the 
same way that clarity would be a desirable trait of any enacted legislation,215 clarity of the initial 
announcement is crucial in light of the announcement’s substantial and intended effect to guide 
the conduct of private entities.  
In terms of changes, the legislative process through which the final legislation is enacted 
inevitably would introduce some differences vis-à-vis the initial announcement. Some 
differences may be relatively inconsequential amendments to the wording, while others may be 
substantive departures. The former is uncontroversial, but material inconsistencies negate the 
advantages of legislation by press release and reintroduce the harm of conventional retrospective 
laws. Private individuals who conducted their affairs in accordance with the rules set forth in the 
initial announcement prior to passage of the final legislation would be caught off-guard by those 
subsequent changes as with any conventional retrospective laws. Of course, substantive 
departures from the initial announcement are not per se undesirable. Indeed, such changes are 
typically the result of deliberation during the legislative process and reflect legislative scrutiny of 
important policies under a healthy democratic process. The point is simply that those changes not 
envisaged by the initial announcement should only be prospectively applied.  
                                                 
215 E.g., see Ji Lian Yap, Constructive Notice and Company Charges, 10 J. CORPORATE L. Stud. 265, 274-277 (2010) 
(discussing the considerations of certainty of both the statutory provision of the charges registration regime and the 
consequential information available to third parties); Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, 
the Eighth Amendment, and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 162-164 (2009) (discussing the undesirable 
ambiguity arising from discerning the appropriate legal precedent from plurality court decisions and circuit splits). 
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In this regard, it is unfortunate that the withdrawal of the exemption for Hong Kong 
Permanent Resident minors was retrospectively applied until October 2012. 216  Until the 
government publicly announced its change of heart in January 2014, all public representations 
from the government had continuously and specifically provided for this exemption.217 Unlike 
the other two changes, which expanded the circumstances in which the BSD would be 
exempted/refunded, this withdrawal was clearly and substantially detrimental to the affected 
private entities. It is easy to sympathize with the unpleasant shock to buyers who designed their 
property purchase in reliance on this express exemption during the period between October 2012 
and January 2014 only to face a hefty 15% tax with the passage of the law.218 To aggravate the 
injury, the government’s insistence on retrospectively applying this withdrawal of exemption can 
be contrasted with the decision of the government in 1992 not to retrospectively apply a similar 
withdrawal of tax exemption for “small ticket leasing” given the ambiguity of the initial 
announcement. 219  This withdrawal will pose an interesting legal issue with respect to the 
expanded notion of “law” and the proportionality principle if litigated in Hong Kong,220 but in 
any event, such a withdrawal is clearly undesirable from a normative perspective. 
B. The Necessity(?) of Legislation by Press Release 
Beyond certainty and consistency, the next criterion for evaluation focuses on whether 
the use of legislation by press release is actually necessary. This criterion is independent of 
whether the substantive aspects of the laws are desirable. Rather, the inquiry proceeds on the 
assumption that the underlying policy objective is sound and focuses on whether the short-
circuiting of the legislative process under legislation by press release is necessary to achieve the 
policy objective. In this regard, it is worth examining possible justifications for conventional 
retrospective legislation that might also be applicable to legislation by press release.  
1. Changing Nature: Beyond Curative Legislation 
Notwithstanding the negative image commonly associated with retrospective laws, there 
are circumstances in which retrospectivity is justified and desirable. The most common and least 
                                                 
216 Supra III.C. 
217 As with the other taxes, the Inland Revenue Department posted a detailed FAQ setting out the specifics of the 
BSD. To question 7 “Whether an agreement for sale signed by a non-HKPR to acquire a residential property and 
hold it as a trustee for a HKPR is subject to BSD?”, the response was given as “An agreement for sale signed by a 
non-HKPR in the capacity of a trustee on behalf of a HKPR is chargeable with BSD, unless the HKPR is a minor or 
a mentally incapacitated person.” A qualification was only added to this question, without modifying the initial 
response, in January 2014 (“The Administration has accepted the views of the members of Bills Committee of the 
Legislative Council and decided to withdraw the proposed BSD exemption for HKPR minors.”): see 
http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/bsd.htm (visited on Oct. 1, 2013 & Jan. 10, 2013). 
218  Zhang Weiwei, Wei chengnian zhiye zhe huobei zhuisu jiaoshui [Minor Property Purchasers May Faced 
Retrospective Tax Bill], SINGTAO DAILY (HK), Feb. 22, 2014, at A4. 
219 Supra IV.B.4. 
220 Supra IV.B.2. No litigation has been publicly announced thus far. 
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controversial form of retrospective laws is “curative legislation,” which can be further classified 
into the different sub-categories: “routine revision,” “restorative legislation,” “validating 
legislation” and “overturning judicial decisions.”221 The majority of the Hong Kong examples of 
retrospective laws discussed in IV.B.4 fit into one of these sub-categories and provide useful 
contrasts to the retrospectivity involved in implementing the BSD.   
Routine revisions are retrospective amendments to relatively minor errors, such as 
typographical errors or unforeseen changes caused by amendments to other legislation.222 The 
1988 amendment to the Societies Ordinance, the 2000 amendment to the Employee’s 
Compensation Ordinance amendment in 2000 and the 2005 amendment to the Bankruptcy 
Ordinance would fall under this category.  
Validating legislation addresses more substantive drafting defects in legislation and is 
usually intended to “validate” erroneous interpretations of the law by the government or private 
entities.223 Examples include the 1991 amendment to the Immigration Ordinance that was meant 
to retrospectively ensure the legality of the transfer of Vietnamese detainees by the Immigration 
Department and the 2000 amendment to the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance that 
shielded employers from possible contraventions of the law.  
Overturning judicial decisions is self-explanatory and is represented by the 1995 
amendment to the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, which explicitly stated its intent to reverse a 1993 
Court of Appeal decision. 224  Restorative legislation addresses legislative schemes that have 
unintentionally been allowed to lapse.225 None of the Hong Kong examples falls into this last 
category, possibly due to the uncommon use of a “sunset” clause in Hong Kong.226  
 The focus of this Article, legislation by press release, has been previously employed a 
couple of times in Hong Kong to tackle tax avoidance. The 1987 and 1992 amendments to the 
Inland Revenue Ordinance were both designed to close tax loopholes and were both backdated to 
the date of announcement.227 This experience echoes that of Australia, where the most frequent 
                                                 
221 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 104-118. 
222 Id, at 104-105; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 237-238. 
223 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 107-115; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 239-245. 
224  Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Nov. 29, 1995; Official Reports of 
Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Nov. 2, 1995. 
225 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 105-107; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 239. 
226 The Government was repeatedly adamant against any sunset clause for the BSD and the SSD: Transport and 
Housing Bureau, The Government’s Response to the Draft Committee Stage Amendments Proposed by the Hon 
Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan , Dec., 2013, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 594/13-14(01). For the earlier rejection of sunset 
clause for the SSD in 2011, see Legislative Council Secretariat, Bills Committee on Stamp Duty (Amendment) (No. 2) 
Bill 2010, June 16, 2011, LegCo Paper No: CB(1) 2444/10-11. Sunset clause was also rejected for the Interception 
of Communication and Surveillance Bill: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), June 
22, 2011, 12564. 
227 Supra IV.B.4. 
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use of legislation by press release was to combat the then-rampant tax avoidance industry.228 The 
fact that these examples of legislation by press release are designed to tackle tax avoidance is 
significant insofar as they could be classified under the conventional curative legislation 
category—in particular, the sub-category of validating legislation. An argument could be made 
that certain tax loopholes are never intended by the legislature in the first place and that 
retrospective amendment is simply intended to restore the original legislative purpose. In a 2013 
case involving retrospective tax, the European Court of Human Rights, in assessing the principle 
of legality, observed that “retroactive taxation can be applicable essentially to remedy technical 
deficiencies of the law”.229 Moreover, because the expectations by tax avoiders are really neither 
rational nor legitimate, the retrospective closing of loopholes is arguably justified even if the 
backdating extends beyond the date of the legislative announcement.230  
 By contrast, the BSD represents a significant departure. The BSD is an entirely novel 
form of taxation that has no equivalence in the existing tax law of Hong Kong, which generally 
does not impose different transaction taxes based on the identity of the parties.231 Thus, there 
could be no arguments about these retrospective amendments being curative in nature. In 
addition, the BSD, while a form of tax, is not enacted for the purpose of revenue but for the 
specific goal of curbing the perceived overheated property market. 232  This, again, can be 
contrasted with the more typical anti-avoidance type of legislation by press release in taxation, 
whether in Hong Kong or in Australia. Indeed, although legislation by press release is by no 
means limited to tax avoidance and has in fact been employed on substantive regulatory matters 
in other jurisdictions,233 the BSD appears to be part of an emerging practice by the Hong Kong 
government to utilize legislation by press release for economic regulation. Beginning with the 
SSD in 2010 and continuing until the 2013 implementation of another property-cooling tax (the 
Double Stamp Duty [“DSD”]), 234  all three taxes have been driven by non-revenue policy 
objectives. Indeed, this departure is even more significant given that, although taxation is an 
important instrument commonly used by other jurisdictions to effect important social and 
                                                 
228 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263. 
229 R.Sz., supra note 180, at ¶40. 
230 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-151 & 245-246; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 257-259. 
231 Exemptions to the stamp duty are sometime provided for the usual suspects of government, foreign diplomatic 
institutions and charitable organizations: §41-44, Stamp Duty Ordinance, supra note 91. For a general discussion of 
the transaction tax regime (including the exemptions) in Hong Kong, see DELOITTE, HONG KONG MASTER TAX 
GUIDE: 2011/12, at 817-884 (CCH 12th ed. 2011).  
232 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100. 
233 Recent examples include prohibition of severance of common land rights in the U.K. and the change in foreign 
takeovers regulation in Australia: SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 262-264. 
234 As a further measure to curb property speculation, the DSD that doubled the stamp duties for all property 
transactions except first time local buyers was introduced in February 23, 2013 with legislation by press release: 
Olga Wong et al., New Duties Trigger Scramble for Sales, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Feb. 23, 2013, at 1; 
Extra Duty “to Hit Speculators Only”, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HK), Feb. 25, 2013, at 1 (Business). 
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economic policies,235 taxation has previously occupied a much smaller policy footprint in Hong 
Kong.236 
2. Justification: Risk of Circumvention? 
Without the ability to resort to a justification based on the curative nature of the 
retrospective amendments, the justification for backdating the legislation to the date of 
announcement must rest on preventing circumvention by private entities. Given that the 
legislative process inevitably takes time, even for non-controversial matters, failure to 
retrospectively apply the new law to the date of announcement would likely result in a surge of 
activities that the new law sought to prevent.237 Moreover, whereas the legislation by press 
release is designed to tackle tax avoidance, the initial announcement would ironically serve as a 
public notification of the existence and legality of these tax loopholes if the announcement were 
not accompanied by intent of retrospective application.238  
The risk of circumvention that would severely undermine legislative purposes is 
particularly acute when the activities involved are durable—i.e., the activities will implicate a 
relatively long-term time horizon. The purchase of real property—the subject matter of the 
BSD—is the classic example. The purchase of real property by most private entities is usually a 
substantial investment that is likely to forestall future purchases over an extended period, 
typically measured in terms of years or even decades. Without legislation by press release, it is 
entirely possible and foreseeable that there would be an incredible surge of property purchases in 
the several months between the date of announcement and the eventual enactment239 that would 
be likely to exhaust the demand (and supply) for the property for the subsequent year or years. 
Similar analysis also applies to vehicles—restrictions on vehicle ownership in a bid to reduce 
traffic congestion must be implemented immediately from the policy announcement to prevent a 
mere shifting of the future demand for vehicles into the interval between the policy 
announcement and legislative enactment.240 
                                                 
235 Gribnau, supra note 31, at 53. 
236 See Cullen et al., supra note 87, at 331-339 (discussing the low rate, narrow base, and straightforward tax regime 
in Hong Kong). 
237 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1089; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 264. See also 
Jaconelli, supra note 8, at 738-740 (discussing the problem of “forestalling” by private entities in response to 
knowledge of pending tax). 
238 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 157; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 263-264.  
239 The initial SSD took a whole of eight months to pass: Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of 
Hong Kong), June 22, 2010, 12660-12661. 
240  The recent implementations of vehicles quota in the Chinese cities of Guangzhou were preceded by an 
announcement the evening before implementation, though the ability to “streamline” the legislative and regulatory 
process under Chinese less than democratic institutional framework meant that this immediate implementation can 
be achieved via prospective regulations rather than legislation by press release: Zhou An, Guangzhou: “yaohao + 
paipei” nengfou cheng zhidu liangfang [Guangzhou: Can “Lottery + Auction” be Ideal Solution for Congestion?], 
RENMIN GONGAN BAO – JIATONG ANQUAN ZHOUKAN, July 17, 2012, at 4. For a comparative discussion of these 
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Nonetheless, it is important to appreciate the nuances of the risk of circumstances posed 
by the different policy objectives because the mere fact that transactions are shifted into the 
period between the policy announcement and eventual enactment does not always defeat the 
legislative purpose. When the objective is the raising of revenue (such as closing tax avoidance 
loopholes) or the curbing of a particular activity (such as restricting vehicle ownership), the 
legislative objectives are thwarted because the lack of retrospective application would mean that 
the shifting would reduce the revenue collected (for the former) or fail to reduce the level of 
activity (for the later).241  
The circumstances are more complicated for the BSD, whose primary goal is not revenue 
raising242 but the twin economic regulatory goals of cooling the property market and reducing 
demand from foreign property purchasers.243 Without retrospective application of the BSD, the 
common prediction is that there would be a rush of foreign speculators purchasing property 
before the BSD’s implementation,244 resulting in an increase in demand for property that is likely 
to inflate prices further prior to the BSD’s actual implementation. However, if property prices in 
Hong Kong are indeed driven up by speculators, then the mere notice that the BSD will become 
applicable sometime in the foreseeable future is likely to dampen the demand immediately 
because speculators (including foreign speculators) will not be keen on investing too much in a 
property that is likely to face increased impediments (i.e., reduced demand by foreigners) in the 
foreseeable future.245 Similarly, demand by entities exempted from the BSD (i.e., Hong Kong 
permanent residents) is likely to be shifted to the period after the BSD’s implementation on the 
expectation of price decreases at that time, further diluting the demand during the transitional 
                                                                                                                                                             
traffic congestion management policies: See generally Jianlin Chen & Jiongzhe Cui, More Market-Oriented Than 
U.S. And More Socialist Than China: A Comparative Public Property Story of Singapore, 23 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 
1 (2014). 
241  See also Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental 
Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 825-826 (2009) (discussing the danger of the preemptive clearing of 
ecologically valuable habitat by private land owners between the serious proposal of the relevant environmental 
preservation regulation and the actual implementation of the regulation that typically do not come with retrospective 
effects). 
242 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100, Annex F (“The proposed adjustments to the existing SSD and the 
introduction of the BSD are not intended to be revenue-generating measures to meet fiscal or budgetary objectives, 
although they are expected to bring about additional revenue to the Government.”). 
243 Transport and Housing Bureau, supra note 100. 
244 There was a rush to purchase by foreign buyers during the short interval between policy announcement and actual 
interval: supra III.B. Previously, this issue of circumvention is the common justifications for legislation by press 
release: Legislative Council Secretariat, Paper for House Committee Meeting on 10 June 2011, June 9, 2011, LegCo 
Paper No: CB(1) 2399/10-11 (implementation of SSD in 2011); Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong), Nov. 27, 1991 (1992 amendment of the Inland Revenue Ordinance). 
245 NICHOLAS G. PIROUNAKIS, REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS: A POINT-TO-POINT HANDBOOK 211-215 (Routledge 2013); 
For a discussion of the sources of risks (including legal and taxation risks) and their impact on current property 
value, see DAVID ISAAC & JOHN O’LEARY, PROPERTY VALUATION TECHNIQUES 172-178 (Palgrave 3rd ed. 2013). 
Hong Kong own experience evidenced this trite point. The property and stock market clashes in the earlier 1980s 
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period. These factors are likely to create a downward pressure on price, allowing the government 
to achieve some “cooling” of the property market and discouragement of foreign property 
purchasers by the mere announcement of the legislature’s plan to impose the BSD. 
However, other characteristics of the Hong Kong property market do increase the risk of 
thwarting the legislative objective. First, companies are subjected to the BSD, but unlike the 
purchase of property by foreign natural persons, the subsequent transfer of the shares of the one-
property company (i.e., a commonly used corporate structure in Hong Kong in which a company 
is set with the sole purpose of holding a property) would not be subjected to the BSD or any real 
estate transaction stamp duty.246 Thus, both foreign and local speculators can purchase a property 
using a company vehicle before the implementation of the BSD with knowledge that the future 
transfer of the property would not be subjected to any BSD regardless of the identity of the 
future purchasers. This speculative activity is only partially hindered by the transaction costs 
involved in the use of company structure and the reluctance of some purchasers concerned with 
not having direct ownership over the property. 247 
Second, given the inevitably time-consuming process of property development and the 
issue of land scarcity in Hong Kong, the shifting of property purchase forward into the 
transitional period may adversely disrupt supply in the foreseeable future. Insofar as there might 
be a greater proportion of foreign buyers within the transitional period, there would be a lower 
supply of property for local buyers after the BSD is finally implemented. Indeed, this situation is 
likely to be aggravated by developers pushing forward the launch of new property in response to 
the pending implementation of the BSD.248 As noted above, developers in Hong Kong are able to 
push forward the property launch by a day with only a few hours’ notice.249  
3. The Proper Focus of Inquiry 
The various aforementioned factors point in different and often opposing directions. On 
balance, legislation by press release is most likely necessary to achieve the purported policy 
objectives in the particular context of Hong Kong. Yet, the key takeaway is that this conclusion 
of necessity is not as straightforward as most assume. Indeed, it is telling that the government’s 
explanatory document on the BSD presented to the legislature in October 2012 did not even 
attempt to justify the use of legislation by press release in the section concerning 
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implementation,250 with only a cursory mention of “[g]iven the price-sensitive nature of the 
property market, the proposed new measures shall take effect from the day immediately 
following the announcement” in the final report of the amendment bill.251 This is unfortunate. 
Notwithstanding the necessity being more obvious in the most commonly used context of tax 
avoidance, retrospective applications are not always necessary in other policy contexts. 
Moreover, even when revenue generation is the primary policy goal, Joseph Jaconelli observed 
that there may be circumstances in which shifting forward the targeted tax activities might 
produce sufficient beneficial side benefits (e.g., a short-term stimulus to the economy) that could 
mitigate the loss in revenue.252   
Charles Sampford, in his earlier 1993 article with Andrew Palmer, made a similar point, 
albeit only in passing, when discussing the 1987 enactment of the Broadcasting (Ownership and 
Control) Act as an illustrative example of how parliament was compelled to enact retrospective 
legislation for which the presiding policy announcement had been relied on by private entities.253 
In that scenario, a flurry of transactions of media ownership had taken place in response to and in 
reliance on the Australian government’s announcement to modify ownership restrictions on 
broadcasters.254 In addition to noting the harm of undermining the parliament, they correctly 
observed that the undermining of the parliament was aggravated by the fact that “there was no 
good reason why the Government had to make the changes effective from the date of 
announcement. Delaying the introduction of the new rule until it was enacted would simply have 
delayed the firing of the starting-gun for the mad media scramble from the date of the 
announcement to the date of enactment.” 255  Indeed, they further articulated that the 
retrospectivity in legislation by press release “should be restricted to situations where there is a 
genuine need for immediate action, or where the making of an announcement that the law is to 
be changed would, unless coupled with a promise to make the change effective from the date of 
announcement, allow citizens to gain some unwarranted advantage from their foreknowledge of 
the change.” 256  These valid points were subsequently and surprisingly omitted by Charles 
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Sampford in his more comprehensive (and much lengthier) book covering essentially the same 
ground, including the use of the exact same example when discussing the illustrative example of 
legislation by press release undermining parliament.257 This omission is unfortunate because 
whether retrospectivity is necessary in relation to the policy goals is clearly relevant for assessing 
the use of legislation by press release.  
Moreover, although considerations about the “genuine need for immediate action” and 
“some unwarranted advantage from their foreknowledge of the [legal] change” are aimed in the 
right direction, they all stem from the fundamental issue of whether shifting forward the 
activities targeted by the legal change would derail the legislative objectives. As illustrated by 
the case study of the BSD, these considerations would first entail identifying what the purported 
legislative objectives are, followed by examining the incentives created by the policy 
announcement for private entities, to predict and assess whether the responses to the 
announcement would undermine the legislative objectives if the legal change is not to have 
retrospective effects until the announcement.  
C. Implications of Political Dynamic  
The case study of the BSD also reveals an interesting nuance to the harm arising from the 
use of legislation by press release, namely, how the political dynamic of a jurisdiction can either 
aggravate or mitigate these harms, whether it be undermining the legislature, inherent uncertainty, 
or excessive delay.258  
1. Implications of Political Dynamic 
The political dynamic of a jurisdiction is the product of the interplay between the formal 
constitutional structure and political competition on the ground. In terms of formal constitutional 
structure, it is important to observe that the use of legislation by press release in Australia and the 
U.K., the jurisdictions surveyed by Charles Sampford in the relevant section of his book,259 is not 
particularly controversial given the institutional designs of these two jurisdictions. The U.K. 
adopts a Westminster parliamentary system in which the executive branch (consisting of the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which is appointed by the Prime Minister) is typically of the 
same political party as that holding the majority of seats in the legislature.260 The parliamentary 
system is similar in Australia, where the political composition of the legislature (the House of 
Representatives) and the executive (the Prime Minister and the Cabinet) are often identical, 
though there is a slight complication arising from an additional elected Senate that was originally 
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designed to safeguard states’ rights (through equal seats per state, regardless of differences in 
population) and has some significant veto power over legislation (especially when compared to 
the U.K.’s House of Lords, which has a more advisory-oriented role).261 Similarly, in Sweden, 
where the prohibition on retroactive taxation is subject to the exception of what is essentially 
legislation by press release, the head of the executive is again selected by the legislature.262 
Given the intentional close proximity between the legislature and the executive under the formal 
institutional arrangements of these jurisdictions, the danger and harm of the perceived 
executive’s usurping of legislative power via legislation by press release are more illusory than 
real. Uncertainty and delay in the legislative outcome are also likely to be less severe in such 
circumstances. This situation is unlike the U.S.-style separation of powers, where it is common 
for the executive and the legislature to be of different political compositions and to be sometimes 
at severe loggerheads with one another.263       
The political competition at any given time does shape the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature and can materially affect the power of the executive. For example, 
the executive under a Westminster-style parliamentary system will wield considerably less 
power (including the power to effect legislation by press release) when the parliamentary 
majority of the corresponding political party is weak or when there is internal division within the 
majority party.264 This situation can cause considerable uncertainty and delay in the legislative 
process and may result in the final legislation departing substantially from the original 
announcement265 or in the retrospective effect being removed altogether.266 On the other hand, 
the actual dominance of one political party in the elections is likely to transcend whatever formal 
separation of powers exists and produce consistency between the executive’s policy objectives 
and the legislature’s legislative activities.267 In this latter scenario, especially if coupled with 
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strong party structure/discipline among the political parties, the use of legislation by press release 
by the executive—even in a U.S.-style separation-of-power system—would only minimally 
undermine the legislature and would be unlikely to cause uncertainty and delay.  
2. Hong Kong’s Fragmented and Antagonistic Political Landscape 
This insight regarding the implications of the political dynamic on the use of legislation 
by press release is particularly relevant for Hong Kong, given the ongoing political transition of 
its fledgling democracy under the “One country Two systems” regime.268 Prior to the handover 
to China in 1997, Hong Kong was essentially governed through the British colonial government, 
a largely executive apparatus with only limited checks from the partially elected legislature.269 
This conspicuous formal lack of separation of powers and any material political competition 
meant that the use of legislation by press release, such as the 1987 and 1992 amendments to the 
Inland Revenue Ordinance,270 could not be any less controversial or problematic.271  
The situation has changed considerably since the time of the handover. The legislature, 
Legislative Council [“LegCo”], is now significantly more autonomous vis-à-vis the executive, 
with all LegCo members now being elected.272 The Basic Law also codifies the lawmaking and 
budget-approving powers of the legislature,273 together with the ability to override the veto of the 
Chief Executive. 274  The Chief Executive, the head of the Hong Kong government, is also 
separately elected,275 though the current arrangement provides for a somewhat limited election 
by an Election Committee that is not itself either directly elected by the population or 
accountable in any way to the LegCo. 276  Moreover, the Chief Executive, upon successful 
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election, must declare that he or she is not a member of any political party,277 further diluting any 
relationship with the dominant political party of the legislature.278  
This formal separation of power is aggravated by the increasingly intense and 
antagonistic political competition in Hong Kong. The political participants in Hong Kong can be 
largely divided into two camps based on their perception and advocacy on the relationship with 
the Chinese central government.279 On the one hand, the “pro-establishment” camp favors a 
closer relationship, or at least the maintenance of the status quo in terms of China’s role in Hong 
Kong economic and social life. The “pan-democrats,” on the other hand, advocate greater 
autonomy for Hong Kong, including a more liberal democratic institution that is distinct from the 
Chinese government’s conceptualization of good governance. 280  The “pan-democrats” have 
consistently garnered a solid majority of the popular vote in elections by universal suffrage, but 
they occupy only a minority in the LegCo due to the institutional design of the LegCo—in 
particular, the use of functional constituencies in which members are elected from a defined 
electorate, typically based on profession or industry.281 To say that the two camps dislike each 
other would be a massive understatement, with the pan-democrats typically voting against 
government policies,282 and attempted compromise with the government by the more moderate 
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fraction of the “pan-democrats” has typically been met with derision by other “pan-
democrats.”283  
There are two further complications that aggravate the uncertainty in the legislative 
process. First, there is an underlying fissure between politicians who are pro-grassroots and those 
who are pro-business. 284  These differences have largely been overshadowed by the more 
ideologically charged issue of China and liberal democracy, but they remain a potential issue for 
major economic policies that involve a substantial wealth-redistribution element.285 The second 
complication relates to the functional constituencies in the LegCo. Given the narrowly defined 
electoral base, it is unsurprising that these functional constituencies of LegCo’s members are 
more concerned with appealing to their constituents’ interests than the overall performance of the 
government.286  
With this combination of formal institutional design and actual political competition, it is 
no surprise that the “Executive has to conduct ‘government by perpetual intensive lobbying, 
horse-trading and playing one political party or grouping off another’” 287  and yet still face 
significant obstacles in obtaining LegCo approval of controversial legislation and appropriations 
for major infrastructure projects.288 All of these factors certainly help explain the delay in the 
legislative approval of the BSD. The amendment bill continued to languish at the legislative-
approval stage more than a year after the policy announcement. As examined above in Part III.C, 
one major cause of the delay was a filibuster by the more radical “pan-democrats” to derail 
general legislative activities. Similarly, there was intense lobbying by the functional group of 
legislators representing the real estate and construction sectors to—not surprisingly—repeal or 
otherwise dilute the tax that negatively impacts the attractiveness of Hong Kong real estate. On 
the other hand, the pro-grassroots politicians were also busy working to appeal to the populist 
sentiment against foreigners (in particular mainlanders) by proposing amendments that further 
extended the reach of the BSD. The controversy over the “oral undertaking” that at one time 
threatened to derail the entire only highlights the intense hostility among the political parties and 
the consequential legislative uncertainty.  
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3. The Problematic Failed Legislation by Press Release 
Such delay and uncertainty in securing legislative approval to give retrospective effect to 
the legal measures previously announced are certainly not conducive to providing information to 
private entities who are desperately seeking guidance on the legal consequences of their intended 
actions. Indeed, this uncertainty negates the main advantage of legislation by press release—
namely, the retrospective effect would not unduly unravel the rational and legitimate expectation 
of private entities in light of the advance warning via the announcement. When private entities 
cannot rely on the legislature adhering to or even effecting the change proposed in the initial 
announcement, they are stuck in a quandary of either proceeding on the basis of the proposed 
new law that may never pass or acting in accordance with the existing law but risking being 
subjected to the proposed new law if it is ultimately passed. This situation renders the reference 
to the previous use of legislation by press release by the current government289 ill-conceived 
because the political dynamic has been dramatically altered.   
Of course, the more interesting issue is the future use of legislation by press release 
beyond the BSD. One likelihood is that the use of legislation by press release will fade away in 
Hong Kong. Frequent refusals of the legislature to advance the executive’s policy objectives 
weaken the power and influence of the executive branch.290 This dynamic aggravates efforts to 
use legislation by press release because it directly undermines the executive’s credibility. Having 
encountered such difficulties over implementation of the BSD (and also the SSD and DSD), the 
executive will arguably be hesitant to utilize such measures in the future. Indeed, it is not 
surprising that the U.S., given its formal separation of power and divided political scene, is 
conspicuously absent in Charles Sampford’s survey of legislation by press release.291 Such a 
development is actually welcome because, notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the use 
of legislation by press release, poorly executed legislation by press release is clearly undesirable 
and should be avoided. 
However, there is another, more disturbing possibility. As observed in IV.B.1, the BSD is 
a departure from previous uses of legislation by press release in Hong Kong in that the policy 
objective is economic regulation rather than the more typical objectives of revenue generation or 
tax avoidance. Moreover, the case study of the BSD demonstrates how the initial announcement, 
despite any legal authorization, has already produced a dramatic impact on people’s behavior 
that is consistent with the policy objective of cooling the property market and reducing demand 
by foreign buyers. Thus, even if the BSD had been ultimately rejected by the LegCo, the 
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executive has successfully managed to achieve its policy objective, at least for the considerable 
period of over a year.292  
The fact that the executive may still achieve some of its policy objectives despite the 
ultimate rejection by the legislature means that legislation by press release remains a potent tool 
for the executive. Such a tool is of limited use when revenue is the objective because the 
government will not be able to collect the revenue until the legislation is passed. However, when 
the objective is to alter the behaviors and actions of private entities, those behaviors and actions 
will be affected from the date of announcement. Of course, repeated failures to secure 
legislature’s “ratification” of the legislation by press release will introduce uncertainty among 
private entities. This situation will dilute the impact but is unlikely to negate the influence of the 
executive announcement on private entities. In particular, given that the legal advice in the 
circumstance of uncertain legislation by press release will be a conservative one that makes 
provision for the proposed laws,293 the announcement’s impact will be substantial for substantial 
economic activities that typically involve lawyers. Thus, unless it is abundantly clear that the 
executive has become a lame duck for political or legal reasons, the executive will have the 
incentive to rely on legislation by press release to out-maneuver an obstructionist LegCo, 
notwithstanding the aggravated concerns over uncertainty and separation of powers. 
 
VI. THE INCONSISTENT HARM OF RETROSPECTIVITY 
Beyond the practice of legislation by press release, this case study also provides a useful 
reexamination of the conventional understanding of retrospective laws. Echoing the existing 
literature on legislation by press release, the retrospective effect of the legislative amendment 
implementing the BSD did not upset the reliance interests of private individuals. The legislative 
amendment was backdated to the public announcement by the government that included a 
relatively detailed exposition of the mechanics of the BSD and received extensive press 
coverage.294 Potential property purchasers and sellers would also have been amply advised by 
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their property agents and lawyers on the pending BSD. In this regard, it is especially noteworthy 
that, with the implementation date of the BSD being the day after the policy announcement, the 
BSD was essentially prospectively implemented vis-à-vis the public announcement. If the 
objections to retrospective laws are primarily based on private individuals being blindsided by 
the subsequent alterations of the legal consequences of their past actions, then they are clearly 
not applicable to the otherwise retrospective BSD. 
 On the other hand, many academics have correctly noted that formally prospective laws 
can nevertheless upset the reliance interests of private individuals. 295  When the activity 
implicated by a prospective law involves a long time horizon or substantial prior preparatory 
work, planning by private individuals can still be detrimentally affected by prospective changes 
of laws taking effect during the continuous duration of the activity or after substantial 
preparatory work has been undertaken.296 In this regard, given the lengthy duration involved in 
the search and purchase of a real estate—a non-trivial transaction for most private entities—there 
would still be major disruptions to private actions even if the initial announcement of the BSD 
were actually accompanied by effective prospective legislation. Private individuals who had 
commenced the process of finding a suitable property for purchase or who were already in the 
process of negotiating the property price might have had to restart the entire process on account 
of the hefty new taxes thwarting their original financial planning.      
This insight about the irrelevance of whether the law is formally retrospective has been 
well established in the U.S. legal literature on “legal transition,” a discourse that incorporates 
economic perspectives to examine the broader issue of how changes in legal rules affect the 
behavior of private entities. Since the major pioneering works of Michael J. Gratz297 and Louis 
Kaplow,298 the concept has enjoyed such wide acceptance and application that a U.S. commenter 
observed, “[m]odern scholarship generally supports the indulgence toward statutory retroactivity, 
arguing that all changes in legal rules, whether nominally retrospective or prospective, defeat 
expectations based on the prior state of the law.” 299  However, such discourse remains 
conspicuously absent in many other jurisdictions where formal retrospectivity is still capable of 
inciting public and political agitation and invites special judicial scrutiny not available to 
formally prospective laws that may otherwise have severe retrospective consequences.300 Indeed, 
the strong objection of a Hong Kong LegCo member (Margaret Ng) to the prior 2010 legislation 
                                                 
295 E.g., SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 24-25; Prebble, Prebble & Smith, supra note 3, at 25-28;  Palmer & Sampford, 
supra note 3, at 221-222. See also Salembier, supra note 3, at 116-118 (arguing for the separate conceptual category 
of vested rights to deal with such situations). 
296 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 24-25; Palmer & Sampford, supra note 3, at 221-222. 
297 Graetz, supra note 28. 
298 Kaplow, supra note 28. 
299 Woolhandler, supra note 64, at 1016 & 1022-1023. For examples of application, see e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & 
Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2010); SHAVIRO, 
supra note 64. 
300 Supra II.A & II.B. 
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by press release implementing the SSD 301  is instructive on misguided criticism based on 
retrospectivity. The retrospectivity of the amendments is the central theme of her criticism, but 
many of the harms she identifies are neither related to retrospectivity (e.g., unfairness arising 
from the substance of the SSD)302 nor applicable in light of the notice given by the government 
(e.g., the guidance of the law).303 This is not to say that the SSD is above criticism but simply 
that retrospectivity is not at issue despite its attractiveness as a rhetorical tool.  
In this regard, Charles Sampford is spot on in critiquing the blanket aversion towards 
retrospective laws while advocating for a contextual analysis that focuses on the affected 
expectations of the private individuals.304 Indeed, if protection of expectations is the rationale, 
then Charles Sampford and others are correct to highlight that the key issue is whether the 
expectation is indeed rational and legitimate,305 with the implication that retrospective laws that 
counteract irrational or illegitimate expectations (e.g., laws targeting tax evasion by exploiting 
unintended legislative loopholes)306 or that seek to protect rational and legitimate expectations 
(e.g., curative legislation to restore previous widespread, reasonable understanding that is 
subsequently judicially adjudicated to be wrong) are consistent and justified under the reliance 
reasoning.307 
Moreover, the analysis of retrospective laws must be sensitive toward the underlying 
political infrastructure of the jurisdiction. The concerns about retrospectivity in particular and 
legal transition in general are premised on both the existence and the desirability of a stable legal 
regime.308 This situation might arguably be true for stable democracies that have not witnessed 
any major changes to their governing institutions for a considerable period, such as the U.K. and 
the U.S. However, this state of affairs is certainly not common around the globe, where ongoing 
                                                 
301 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), June 22, 2011, 12561-12564. 
302 The highlighted problems relating to the uncertainty surrounding the definition of “acquired” and “disposed of” 
or unfairness due to the lack of exemption for transactions between close relatives remained in the final version of 
the bill that was ultimately passed, and would not be remedied by the removal of retrospectivity: c.f. Official Reports 
of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), June 22, 2011, 12562-12563; §29CA, Stamp Duty Ordinance, 
supra note 91. 
303 Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), June 22, 2011, 12561-12562. 
304 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 247-256. See also GOLDING, supra note 5, at 247-252 (discussing the criteria of 
whether reasonable expectations are unfairly frustrated that was advanced by Lon L. Fuller). 
305 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 88-95; Fisch, supra note 3, at 1085-1086. See Påhlsson, supra note 8, at 273 (noting 
EU jurisprudence that seeks to protect legitimate expectations). See also GOLDING, supra note 5, at 246-247 
(observing how the passage of time may affect the analysis – where individuals may have reasonable expectations 
about the continuation of laws that are otherwise promulgated by a dubious regime and morally suspect if that 
dubious regime enjoys considerable longevity). 
306 SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-151 (discussing Australian retrospective laws against blatant tax evasion). 
307 Id., at 104-118 (discussing the various sub-categories of curative legislation). 
308 C.f. Fisch, supra note 3, at 1105-1108 (observing how the conventional fairness arguments – as opposed to the 
efficiency arguments that favors retrospectivity – are most applicable in the situation where the law/regulation is in a 
stable equilibrium). 
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political and democratic transitions remain the current norm. In Hong Kong, for example, 
vigorous public debate and political maneuvering have been ongoing with respect to 
constitutional reforms to transition the current “partial democracy”309 into one in which the Chief 
Executive and LegCo are truly democratically elected by universal suffrage.310 
Where a jurisdiction is undergoing substantial changes in the very foundation of its 
constitutional structure, both of the premises that underpin the objections towards retrospectivity 
are absent. The existence of a stable legal regime is by definition absent during institutional 
transition. The desirability of stability is also questionable in a context where the shortcomings 
of the prior regime typically serve as the impetus for change. Martin P. Golding argued that 
retrospective legislation may be “the best way of dealing with a messy situation” arising from the 
transition of a despotic regime to a democratic government given the need to express moral 
judgment of the past.311 Indeed, even in the context of stable democracies, there may be selected 
areas where legal changes are frequent at certain times such that retrospectivity is desirable312 or 
where retrospective laws are necessary to remedy the underlying regime suffering from systemic 
deficiencies in need of change.313 
Thus, this case study of legislation by press release reaffirms the fallacy of adopting a 
special approach when dealing with formal retrospectivity. A proper appreciation of the 
rationales against retrospectivity reveals that the importance of protecting the reliance interests of 
private individuals is neither universal among nor unique to formally retrospective laws. It is 
more fruitful to be sensitive to the expectations that will be altered under any laws and to 
appreciate that there will be many instances in which the alteration of such expectations, whether 
by retrospective or prospective laws, will be normatively justified. These considerations are 
especially important for regimes undergoing transition, where there is likely to be a greater scope 
of circumstances in which retrospective laws are normatively justified. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The implementation of the BSD provides an illustrative case study to critically reexamine 
legislation by press release in particular and retrospective laws in general. The prospective 
announcement of pending retrospective changes to law not only enhances the legality of 
                                                 
309 Lam, supra note 115, at 137. Bill Chou regards Hong Kong system as an “non-liberal” regime: Chou, supra note 
269, at 228. 
310 Cheng, supra note 279, at 242; Albert H.Y. Chen, Hong Kong’s Constitutional Moment of 2014, 43 HONG KONG 
L. J. 791, 791-792 (2013). 
311 GOLDING, supra note 5, at 258-261. 
312 Fisch, supra note 3, at 1108-1111. 
313 For example, rampant tax avoidance in Australia during the 1970s due to a combination of legal and political 
factors: SAMPFORD, supra note 2, at 147-151. 
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legislation by press but also defuses the objections to retrospective laws that are premised on 
protecting the reliance interests of private individuals. Notwithstanding qualms about the 
increased use of this mechanism to effect speedy legal changes, legislation by press release may 
be normatively justified—but only after circumspect examination of whether the use is really 
necessary to prevent circumvention of policy objectives and whether the underlying political 
dynamic will aggravate the harm of uncertainty and the executive’s usurpation of legislative 
powers. On a broader note, legislation by press release confirms that the conventional aversion 
towards retrospective laws can misleadingly distract from the crux issue of legal transition in 
both retrospective and prospective laws.  
The awareness of these issues is critical. Given the general legality of both legislation by 
press release and retrospective law under the current laws of most jurisdictions, a well-informed 
public discourse and political process are ultimately the best check to ensure that the usage of the 
practice is confined to situations in which it is truly warranted. After all, the use of legislation by 
press release—to effect potentially far-reaching economic regulation no less—is not going away 
anytime soon. 
 
